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REPLACING POLITICS WITH DEMOCRACY:
A PROPOSAL FOR COMMUNITY PLANNING
IN NEW YORK CITY AND BEYOND
Amy Widman*
INTRODUCTION
Once an active port providing jobs for many New Yorkers,
Brooklyn’s waterfront fell into disuse during the second half of
the twentieth century as the city’s economy came to rely more
heavily on roads for shipping. Miles of shoreline fell into
neglect, leaving disrepair and environmental hazards.
Revitalization of the waterfront entered the city’s agenda in the
1990s, but the resulting plans lacked vision and varied widely
from one neighborhood to another. Some of the largest swaths of
waterfront were completely left out of the revitalization process
by city leaders and private developers who lacked political and
financial incentive to work with certain local communities. This
selective approach to revitalization placed an unequal burden on
those communities and denied them a voice in important
decisions regarding the delicate balance of environmental cleanup, cultivation of green space and protection of active industry
and jobs.

* Law clerk to the Hon. Theodore H. Katz, U.S. Magistrate Judge, in the
Southern District of New York. J.D., cum laude, New York University, 2002;
B.A., Northwestern University, 1996. The author would like to thank
Professor Vicki Been, the editorial staff of the Journal of Law and Policy and
all those involved in community planning in Brooklyn who took the time to
speak with the author about the practices and procedures of an informal
process. She also would like to thank her friends and family, especially Dan,
for their love and support.

135

WIDMANDMACRO1-20.DOC

136

4/1/03 2:56 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

This article tells two stories of community planning in
Brooklyn to illustrate possible reasons for the divergent
development of the waterfront and suggests ways in which local
communities can be involved. It offers public participation as a
solution to disparate treatment and examines whether the
comprehensive planning process lives up to its ideal as a method
of public participation. Part I provides a background to the
debate and theoretical discussions underlying community
planning. Part II explores the value of public participation in land
use decision making. Part III chronicles the history of
community-sponsored planning in New York City. Part IV sets
forth two case studies of recent attempts to rezone neighborhoods
through community-sponsored plans. The two communities
studied, Vinegar Hill and Greenpoint, are located within a few
miles of each other along the East River in Brooklyn. They share
a common industrial past, and many manufacturing buildings still
dot their waterfronts. The neighborhoods differ greatly in size,
demographics and, most significantly for this analysis,
experience with the land use decision-making process. Part V
applies the two case studies to identify which factors help or
hinder a community in its efforts to draft a comprehensive plan.
Part VI explores policies that equalize the necessary resources
and negotiating power among communities, encouraging more
diverse public participation in land use decision making. Part VII
proposes a legislative change that would reward communities for
their planning efforts and encourage inclusive processes. Finally,
this article concludes with a call to reevaluate the current land
use decision-making process with the objective of including
residents and workers in the process in a meaningful way.
The focus on New York City both grounds and restricts this
article. The case studies are local in nature, and a comparison of
only two experiences has inherent limitations. The diversity and
density of Brooklyn, however, makes it a prime subject for
examining how the land use process actually affects residents,
and how failures of public participation occurs. Brooklyn’s
diverse population requires consensus-building strategies, and its
population density is integrally related to its problem of scarce
resources. While the local government structure of New York
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City may not mirror other jurisdictions, the purpose of this
analysis is to explore how land use regulation can incorporate a
real commitment to public participation by allowing and
encouraging all communities to play an active role in the
development strategies of their neighborhoods.
I. BACKGROUND
A controversy exists among planners, lawyers, policy makers
and community leaders about how to formulate land use
decisions. This dispute pits urban economics and democracy
against one another as, at best, incompatible. Urban economists
favoring a cost-benefit approach to land use decision making
argue that this methodology is more efficient than focusing on
public interest concerns because, at bottom, the primary social
good is economic efficiency, not subjective notions of values.1
These scholars contend that public participation itself is
inefficient.2
1

See Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community SelfDetermination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy,
53 IND. L.J. 145, 148-53 (1977-78) (comparing the economic or public choice
model with the opposed public interest model of local government legitimacy);
see also Shi-Ling Hsu & John Loomis, A Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis for
Natural Resource Policy, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10239 (2002) (asserting that
cost-benefit analysis is a better tool for decision making than the alternatives);
David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545 (1997) (providing
background for cost-benefit analysis and questioning whether cost-benefit
criteria has a coherent and compelling rationale); Courtney Harrington, Penn
Central to Palazzolo: Regulatory Takings Decisions and Their Implications for
the Future of Environmental Regulation, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 383, 401
(2002) (discussing the trend towards public policy to deal with conflicting
social and legal interests associated with urban development).
2
See NELSON M. ROSENBAUM, Citizen Participation and Democratic
Theory, in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA 43 (Stuart Langton, ed., 1978)
(noting that public participation is costly and can result in lackluster solutions
in order to accommodate all views); see also Hanoch Dagan, Takings and
Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 777 (1999) (arguing that public
interests should not be followed to “protect members of our local communities
from various forms of abuse”); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Uneasy Case for
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Public interest advocates respond that economic equations do
not encourage democracy, and restricting policy guidance to
economic factors limits the options available to decision makers.
These theorists argue that land use decisions are ethical in nature,
and economics should not play any role.3 This argument is
commonly based on recognition of the deleterious and
undemocratic effects that asymmetrical market forces have on
land use.4
Direct democracy is sometimes touted as a tool for public
participation in land use decision making. Advocates of direct
democracy argue that participation through initiative and
referenda
encourages
accountability
and
government
responsiveness.5 Critics claim that this so-called ballot box
Devolution of the Individual Income Tax, 85 IOWA L. REV. 907, 939 (2000)
(discussing Nelson M. Rosenbaum’s perspective that public participation
“itself is neither rewarding nor conducive to the growth of strong community
bonds”); Adam N. Bram, Public Participation Provisions Need Not Contribute
to Environmental Injustice, 5 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 145, 158
(1996) (discussing skeptics’ views that public participation is inefficient
because it is expensive, hinders implementation of decisions, and relies on
decision making by the public, whose ability to make complex decisions is
questionable).
3
See Nancy Perkins Spyke, Public Participation in Environmental
Decisionmaking at the New Millennium: Structuring New Spheres of Public
Influence, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 263, 294-95 (1999); see also John
W. Ragsdale, Jr., Some Philosophical, Political and Legal Implications of
American Archeological and Anthropological Theory, 70 UMKC L. REV. 1,
16 n.78 (2001) (stating that “the thought that economics should determine land
use undermines the ethical and scientific principles of ecological rationality”);
John Arntz, Prairie Wetlands: A Reflection of Why We Need a Land Ethic, 1
GREAT PLAINS NAT. RES. J. 193, 204 (1996) (noting that “[c]ost-benefit
analysis has acquired a negative reputation regarding land uses and our
ecosystems because ecological processes are difficult to evaluate monetarily”).
4
See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES
TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 142-43, n.104 (1998)
(noting that “in the absence of extensive planning in a liberal economy, the
asymmetrical market forces which shape the city are hardly democratic.”).
5
See, e.g., THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 10-11 (1989) (stating that if voters
become frustrated with the decisions of politicians and administrative agencies,
a populist democracy will allow the people to make the desired law and this,
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zoning suffers from too much majoritarian public participation.
Other scholars worry that direct democracy has no safeguards for
capture by special interest groups.6 Other critics of direct
democracy argue that lack of information and expertise causes
citizens to make poor planning decisions.7 Both capture by
special interest groups and lack of information can increase the
prevalence of discriminatory measures that disadvantage the
under-represented.8
in turn, will encourage officials to extend greater deference to the voice of the
people); see also CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE
UNITED STATES (Shaun Bowler, Todd Donavan & Caroline J. Tolbert eds.)
(1998) (examining whether the goals of direct democracy, providing voting
mechanisms that allow citizens to get around legislators biased in favor of the
wealthy and making politicians more responsive to the public will have been
achieved); M. DANE WATERS, THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING
(2001) (discussing the initiative process as a mechanism for influencing public
policy at all levels of government).
6
See, e.g., DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON
BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 145-51, 182, 198-99 (1984)
(stating that special interest groups may frequently veto initiatives and that
they are heavily involved in the referendum process since there is a direct
correlation between greater expenditures and ballot proposition victories);
CRONIN, supra note 5, at 198-99 (noting that large, organized groups and
those groups that can raise vast sums of money are better situated to win, and
even more so, to block, any ballot box measures); WATERS, supra note 5, at
59 (discussing the historical role of special interest groups in referendum and
initiative ballot contests and analyzing the impact these well-funded groups
have on campaign wins).
7
See generally MAGLEBY, supra note 6, at 127-44.
8
See, e.g., David L. Callies et al., Ballot Box Zoning: Initiative,
Referendum and the Law, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 53, 94-95
(1991) (stating that “one of the most potentially troublesome problems with
initiative and referendum is their tendency to dilute minority rights whether or
not direct discrimination is intended”); John F. Niblock, Anti-Gay Initiatives:
A Call for Heightened Judicial Scrutiny, 41 UCLA L. REV. 153, 189 (1993)
(noting that initiatives and referendums can be a means to direct “bigotry,
discrimination and prejudice” especially when they deal with the rights
minority groups); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier
to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978) (explaining that racial
minorities, fueled by frustration with their elected representatives, turned to
“do-it-yourself” government using referenda to reject existing laws and enact
new laws).
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Nonetheless, New York City and its communities can use
public participation as a planning tool to reconcile land use
decisions with the democratic process. Advocates of public
participation cite to the virtues of accountability, community and
consensus building and the social efficiency engendered by
informal debates and discussions that take place throughout the
planning process.9 This article draws on that model of public
participation, and argues that the public should have a more
prominent voice in land use decisions. The city should reward
public participation by adopting community-sponsored plans that
evince concern for achieving harmony between environmental,
economic and social factors—a balance that can be achieved only
through an inclusive process.
II. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Public participation means many things; for purposes of this
article the term refers to a change in process that improves
democracy by fostering inclusiveness. If decision makers yield to
public desires after an inclusive process, redistribution of power
back into the hands of the people is possible.10 Effective
participation can be achieved through education, access to useful
information, meaningful interaction with government officials
9

See, e.g., Carol Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist
Empire: Anti-Federalism From the Attack on “Monarchism” to Modern
Localism, 84 N.W. U. L. REV. 74, 96-97 (1989) (citing the virtues of
“possibilities for constituent contact and civic participation” in local
government as “structural restraints” on political power); Peter W. Salsich,
Jr., Grassroots Consensus Building and Collaborative Planning, 3 WASH. U.
J. L. & POL’Y 709, 712 (2000) (commenting that collaborative planning
allows for residents to have a stake in the outcome of decisions and is an
effective technique for information transfer).
10
See MARY GRISEZ KWEIT & ROBERT W. KWEIT, IMPLEMENTING
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN A BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY: A CONTINGENCY
APPROACH 31 (1981); see also Tom Angotti, Race, Place and Waste:
Community Planning in New York City, NEW VILLAGE, available at
http://www.newvillage.net/ angotti.pdf (1999) (noting that public participation
in planning goes back to the 1930s, when tenant actions in New York City
created rent control).

WIDMANDMACRO1-20.DOC

4/1/03 2:56 PM

COMMUNITY PLANNING

141

and open dialogue.11 Although the passage of the Administrative
Procedure Act drafted a form of public participation into
administrative decision making,12 this codification focuses
exclusively on public hearings to insure that individual opinions
are heard and merely brings views into the open at the decisionmaking stage.13 This inherently lacks focus on consensus
building, and tends to polarize viewpoints at a juncture when
only one view can ultimately prevail.
Meaningful public participation focuses on the process, rather
than the ultimate decision. This article applies a process-oriented
model to the case studies described herein and suggests
legislative change that would reward consensus-building
11

See generally Paul Wilkinson, Public Participation in Environmental
Management: A Case Study, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 117, 119 (1976)
(explaining open planning’s use of education, review, and dialogue as an
integral part of the planning and decision-making process).
12
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2002). The Federal Administrative
Procedure Act provides, generally, for public participation in administrative
decision-making process through the use of a public hearing. Id.
13
See generally Spyke, supra note 3, at 269 (noting that public
participation in governmental decision making emerged after passage of the
Administrative Procedures Act, which formalized public participation at the
federal level). In time, governmental agencies offered educational programs to
the public, published news releases about their activities, and hired experts to
develop participation programs, all in an effort to open the decision-making
process to the public. Id. See also Marco Verweij, Why is the River Rhine
Cleaner than the Great Lakes (Despite Looser Regulation)?, 34 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 1007 (2000) (discussing the Administrative Procedures Act and its role
in requiring federal agencies to seek public participation before enacting new
water protection policies); Michael I. Jeffery, Intervenor Funding as the Key
to Effective Citizen Participation in Environmental Decision-Making: Putting
the People Back into the Picture, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 643, 649
(2002) (discussing the Administrative Procedures Act’s expansion of public
notice and opportunity to obtain access to agency policies and decisions for
inspection, participate in adjudication, and comment in national environmental
rulemaking); Jim Rossi, Thirty-First Annual Administrative Law Issue: Politics
and Policy: Presidential Administrations and Administrative Law: Bargaining
in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public Interest in Rulemaking
Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015, 1020-21 (2001) (comparing the inadequacies
of the notice and comment rulemaking process underlying the Administrative
Procedures Act with a consensus-based negotiated regulation).
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participatory procedures. Inclusion of all community residents
provides exposure to a healthy mix of perspectives, improving
the decision-making process.14 This benefits the city by insuring
fully informed decisions, and greater legitimacy and acceptance
of decisions by the local population.15 The process itself also
benefits communities by empowering residents and creating
leaders.16
Critics of extensive participation at the policy stage cite the
deleterious result to administrative goals of efficiency, expertise
and control.17 Agencies such as the City Planning Commission
may criticize extensive public participation because it drains city
resources. Indeed, public participation can be inefficient in
economic terms.18 The challenge, then, is to devise a process that
14

See Spyke, supra note 3, at 267-68. Spyke notes that “[b]ecause
government is derived from the people, all citizens have a right to influence
governmental decisions, and the government should respond to them.
Widespread participation exposes decisionmakers to a healthy mix of
perspectives, which is believed to improve the decisionmaking process.”
(citations omitted). Id.
15
Id. at 271. (noting that agencies that engage in participation programs
“strive to exchange information with the public, deal with diverse groups
within the community, demonstrate a responsiveness to public concerns, and
ultimately gain public acceptance of their decisions.”)
16
Id. at 301. Spyke notes that “[t]oday, public participation increasingly
is viewed not merely as a method by which well-informed decisions can be
reached, but also a way to empower communities and create community
leaders.” Id. She further posits that “[t]he sense of efficacy that accompanies
this empowerment, that arises when involved citizens see their participation
activities as part of a ‘larger whole,’ is a secondary end-product that is taking
on greater significance.” Id. (citations omitted).
17
Id. at 273. (noting that public participation’s “emphasis on the
individual and direct access to decisionmakers conflicts with collectivist theory
and republicanism. It also undermines the administrative goals of efficiency
expertise, and control”).
18
See id. (“On a more practical level, public participation is inefficient in
terms of cost and time”). Admittedly, the money required for education,
outreach, and meetings may seem burdensome for a process that is not
guaranteed to produce results. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the fact that
access to resources is both a costly and necessary element of informed
planning decisions). See also Interview with Eva Handhart, Director of
Municipal Art Society’s Planning Center, in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 19, 2000)
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is consistent in its reliance on public participation without
stripping agencies of all their resources.
Encouraging vulnerable communities to take an active role in
the planning and zoning decisions affecting their neighborhoods
may seem elementary, but the case studies below reveal myriad
organizational stumbling blocks and political process failures that
result from subtle forms of discrimination. These studies also
reveal a potential downfall of community planning: it is not
successful unless the city has independent reasons to assist
communities with planning. Whether due to economic, political
or social concerns, the Department of City Planning does not
give enough respect to the process of community planning.19
Where a low-income community has undergone years of
organizational struggle to transform an inclusive consensusbuilding process into a community plan, the department no longer
has an excuse to favor communities that are more politically
influential.20 Lack of respect for such plans may, therefore,
[hereinafter Handhart Interview] [transcript on file with author] (stating that
prior to receiving technical assistance from the Pratt Institute, Greenpoint’s
planning efforts were hindered by communication breakdowns, financial
constraints and rifts between renters, homeowners and various ethnic groups).
19
See infra Part III (noting that the Commission weakened the potential
impact of amendments to the City Charter by officially interpreting community
plans as nonbinding policy guidelines). Relegating community-sponsored plans
to nonbinding policy guides arguably illustrates lack of respect for the plans.
20
See generally Adam D. Schwartz, The Law of Environmental Justice: A
Research Pathfinder, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 10543 (1995) (noting that potentially
harmful hazardous waste facilities often attract local opposition, so builders of
such facilities prefer to locate them in communities that are politically weak
and cataloguing recent state and federal legislation and case law on
environmental justice issues); Rachel D. Godsil, Remedying Environmental
Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 394, 398 (1991) (explaining that “minority
communities are target[ed] for hazardous waste facilities and other
environmental hazards because their residents are poor and politically
powerless. Waste management firms find it politically expedient to site these
facilities in minority communities who tend to be vulnerable to offers of
compensation made in exchange for accepting hazardous environmental
conditions”); Gregory H. Meyers, Developing a Cohesive Front Against
Environmental Injustice, 8 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 27, 30 (2000) (quoting
environmental justice advocate Luke Cole, Staff Attorney at the California
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reflect a bias for communities with a higher income base.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COMMUNITY PLANNING IN NEW YORK
CITY
In New York City, the City Planning Commission and the
City Council are responsible for deciding rezoning requests.21
Elected officials appoint the Commissioners.22 Community
Boards can make recommendations to the City Planning
Commission, but otherwise have no real authority when it comes
to planning decisions.23 Indeed, the Commission’s processes seem
designed to discourage public participation—public hearings take
place at ten o’clock on Wednesday mornings, making the
hearings inaccessible to those with daytime obligations such as
work or family, and calendar notices and subscriptions are
available at a large fee.24
In 1963, at the beginning of a long trend toward decentralized
planning, the City Council established Community Boards as
advisory bodies.25 Borough Presidents appoint their Community
Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, that “poor people are . . . more likely
than others to have multiple exposures to environmental dangers, facing more
severe hazards on the job, in the home, in the air they breathe, in the water
they drink, and in the food they eat”).
21
See NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, 197-A PLAN
TECHNICAL GUIDE 1 (1997) (discussing the responsibilities and duties of the
City Planning Commission and City Council).
22
For a full explanation of the composition and tasks of the Commission,
see New York City Planning Commission Website, available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/home.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2003)
[hereinafter N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning Website]. The Mayor appoints
seven Commissioners; the five Borough Presidents and the Public Advocate
each appoint one. Id.
23
See generally N.Y.C. CHARTER § 2800(d)(1)-(21) (2001) (setting forth
the duties of community boards as largely advisory and bodies that assist city
agencies in disseminating information to local residents).
24
See N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning Website, supra note 22. Individuals
wishing to be placed on the calendar mailing list are advised to send a certified
check of $100 to the Department of City Planning for a one year subscription.
Id.
25
See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1152(a) (2001) (“This charter shall take effect
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Board members.26 Community Board membership is on a
volunteer basis.27 A New York City Charter revision in 1977
created the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (“ULURP”).28
ULURP mandates that Community Boards review and vote on all
land use applications in their jurisdictions.29 The creation of
Community Boards and ULURP signified the growing interest in
bringing citizen involvement to planning decisions. Although
ULURP introduced the possibility of Community Board
sponsored plans under Section 197-a, it did not clarify the details
of any such plans.30
on the first day of January, nineteen hundred sixty-three.”). See also Thomas
Angotti, New York City’s “197-a” Community Planning Experience: Power to
the People or Less Work for Planners?, Pratt Institute Center for Community
and
Environmental
Development,
available
at
www.picced.org/advocacy/197a. htm (Oct. 19, 1995) (“Community Planning
Boards were established as advisory bodies in 1963.”). Agnotti’s report on
New York City community planning experience was presented to the 37th
annual Conference of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning,
October 19-21, 1995 in Detroit. Id. Agnotti’s research was conducted in
conjunction with individuals receiving grants from the Municipal Arts Society
of New York City. Id.
26
See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 2800(a) (2001) (“For each community district
created pursuant to chapter sixty-nine there shall be a community board which
shall consist of (1) not more than fifty persons appointed by the borough
president for staggered terms of two years”); see also The Municipal Art
Society of New York, The State of 197-a Planning in New York City 3 (1998)
[hereinafter MAS, STATE OF 197-A PLANNING].
27
See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 2800(c) (2001). (“Members of community
boards shall serve as such without compensation but shall be reimbursed for
actual and necessary out-of-pocket expenses in connection with attendance at
regularly scheduled meetings of the community board.”).
28
See generally N.Y.C. CHARTER § 197-c (2001). The New York City
Charter created the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure in 1977,
establishing community boards as advisory bodies in zoning and land use
areas. Id.
29
See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 197-c(c) (2001) (“The department of city
planning shall be responsible for certifying that applications pursuant to
subdivision (a) of this section are complete and ready to proceed through the
uniform land use review procedure provided for in this section.”)
30
See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 197-c(h) (2002) (“Not later than sixty days
after expiration of time allowed for the filing of a recommendation or waiver
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Demands from communities for greater control over land use
decisions led to a revision of the Charter in 1989. These revisions
encouraged community planning and active participation by the
community in rezoning requests, and strengthened Section 197-a
by providing a process by which communities could sponsor their
own land use plans.31 The revised Section 197-a offered hope for
community-sponsored plans by clarifying the steps to put together
such a plan:32
Plans for the development, growth, and improvement of
the city and of its boroughs and community districts may
be proposed by (1) the mayor, (2) the city planning
commission, (3) the department of city planning, (4) a
borough president, (5) a borough board with respect to
land located within its borough, or (6) a community board
with respect to land located within its community
district.33
The revised Section 197-a took an important step towards
facilitating meaningful public participation by making planning
with the city planning commission by a borough president, the commission
shall approve, approve with modifications, or disapprove the application”).
The ULURP mandates, generally, that Community Boards review all land use
applications, and allows for a Community Board to sponsor its own land use
application. Id.
31
See generally N.Y.C. CHARTER § 197-a(a) (2001). See also Agnotti,
supra note 25 (“Indeed, the establishment of community boards and a process
for community planning are responses to decades of intense community
opposition to official plans, many of which were stopped cold by
neighborhood protests.”).
32
See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 197-a(a) (2001). The guidelines provide that
[a] community board, borough board or borough president that
proposes any such plan shall submit the plan together with a written
recommendation to the city planning commission for determinations
pursuant to subdivision b of this section. Any such submission may be
made by a community board, borough board or borough president
only after the board or borough president proposing such a plan has
held a public hearing on the plan.
Id. See also N.Y.C. CHARTER § 197-a(c) (2001) (setting forth the documents
required to accompany any such plans).
33
N.Y.C. CHARTER § 197-a(a) (2001).
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available to communities through their Community Boards and
Borough Presidents.34 It also removed the burden of
environmental reviews from the Community Boards and gave this
responsibility to the Department of City Planning.35
Section 197-a mandated, however, that the City Planning
Commission set its own standards for reviewing community
proposals.36 The Commission proceeded to weaken the potential
impact of the amendments by officially interpreting community
plans as nonbinding policy guides.37 Now, the finished plans
merely impose a requirement that future land use decisions be
reviewed against them.38 The community bears the onerous
burden of scrutinizing the Commission and exposing action that
does not conform to the goals of the plan.39 Although the
Commission encourages monitoring, this arguably creates an
adversarial, defensive climate that may create conflict between
communities and the agency.40
These rules have not been subjected to legal or judicial
scrutiny, though they would likely be deemed reasonable given
34

See Agnotti, supra note 25. Agnotti notes that, “prior to 1990, there
was no explicit authorization in the City Charter for Community Boards to
propose their own plans.” Id.
35
Id. (“After the Charter revision, the Department of City Planning took
responsibility for the environmental review of community plans.”). This was
significant because environmental review is both costly and highly technical,
two factors that previously foreclosed involvement at the community level. Id.
36
See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 197-a(b) (2001). The amendments require that
“[t]he city planning commission shall adopt rules establishing minimum
standards for the form and content of the plans.” Id.
37
See 62 R.C.N.Y. § 6-01(b) (2001). The official interpretation states
that “[a]n adopted plan shall serve as a policy to guide subsequent actions by
city agencies. . . [t]he existence of an adopted 197-a plan shall not preclude
the sponsor or any other city agency from developing other plans or taking
actions not contemplated by the 197-a plan.” Id.
38
Id.
39
See generally MAS, STATE OF 197-A PLANNING, supra note 26, at 14.
Currently, the City Charter has no provision setting forth internal review or
monitoring methods. Id.
40
See Spyke, supra note 3, at 274 (noting that “[i]mplementing
regulations may generate conflicts from the outset by providing only scant
provisions cast in adversarial terms”).
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that many community proposals lack necessary technical
specificity and detail.41 The provisions, however, create a
disincentive for communities to initiate the planning process and
invest resources in a plan that ultimately has no authority.42
Moreover, 197-a plans have not proved entirely successful even
as policy guides due to the lack of technical assistance, scarce
financial resources and informational obstacles, resulting in plans
that are piecemeal.43 These problems are exacerbated in lowincome or politically marginalized neighborhoods, and may
render the 197-a process inaccessible to some communities.44
Another oft-scrutinized section of the 1989 amendments states
that the Department of City Planning will “[p]rovide community
boards with such staff assistance and other professional and
technical assistance as may be necessary to permit such boards to
perform their planning duties and responsibilities under this
41

See Angotti, supra note 25 (recognizing that, ultimately, many plans
have these limitations whether or not they are formally stated because there is
never guaranteed implementation of a plan).
42
See id. Angotti notes that, “some communities were quick to recognize
the limitations of the 197-a process and chose not to invest their energy and
resources.” Id. He further asks, “[w]hy should a community board spend at
least two years to develop a plan, and another two years to get it approved, to
end up with a document that may not have much legal effect on future land
use?” See also Spyke, supra note 3, at 274. Spyke notes that, even when
participation does take place, “[w]hoever is likely to participate is likely to
experience a drain in terms of time and personal cost. Not only does it take
time to become comfortable with the technical nature of many issues, but
personal costs tend to come up-front and results can be a long time coming.”
Id.
43
Id.; see also MAS, STATE OF 197-A PLANNING, supra note 26, at 8-10
(noting that plans received by the City Planning Commission are not always
properly formatted or complete in substance).
44
This aspect of the Commission’s interpretation unnecessarily aggravates
the problems of economic disparity and public action inherent in public
participation programs. See, e.g., Spyke, supra note 3, at 274 (noting that
“[w]hen participation does take place, studies have shown that participants
tend to be from upper socioeconomic classes, leading to common charges of
elitism”). See also infra Part V (discussing the demographic differences
between Vinegar Hill and Greenpoint and the impact of those differences on
the success of each community’s proposed plan).
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chapter.”45 In fact, such assistance is rarely given.46 Only a few
planners who work with communities are on staff at the
Department of City Planning, and they focus primarily on
reviewing the plans rather than assisting with development.47 Nor
does the City provide consistent training programs for
Community Board members who want to take on difficult or
technical planning tasks.48 Scarcity of technical assistance hinders
low-income communities more than higher-income, because a
higher-income community may have more access to professional
planners and developers.49 As the following narratives highlight,
45

N.Y.C. CHARTER § 191(5) (2001); see also MAS, STATE OF 197-A
PLANNING, supra note 26, at 10 (reiterating this element of the City Charter).
46
Angotti, supra note 25. Angotti notes that “[i]f resources were
available to community boards, perhaps more would consider the potential
benefits of planning. The City Planning Department is the most likely agency
to provide resources, and has provided very few.” Id. Further, he notes that
staffing in borough offices has been “progressively cut since 1990.” Id. One
commentator has noted that failure to provide assistance may also be a product
of a “philosophical objection to loss of control, something that is inherent in
public participation programs.” Spyke, supra note 3, at 274.
As recently as 2001, Community Board 1 continued to ask the city to
allocate funds to develop 197-a plans and “urge the City to implement the
Charter mandate of providing additional funding for each Community Board to
have a planner on staff.” See DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, CITY OF NEW
YORK, COMMUNITY DISTRICT NEEDS 22 (2001) [hereinafter COMMUNITY
DISTRICT NEEDS].
47
Angotti, supra note 25 (noting that the Department has one planner
city-wide to work part-time in reviewing and processing of 197-a plans and
planners in Borough offices generally function as reviewers, not advocates).
48
Id. (noting that “[t]he City does not provide any consistent training in
planning for community board staff or members”); see also Clarice E.
Gaylord & Geraldine W. Twitty, Protecting Endangered Communities, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 782 (1994) (noting that responsibility to help
residents take an active role in planning “also rests in the hands of state and
local city planners, zoning officials, housing experts, and environmental
officers who must provide more responsible protection for all communities”).
49
Angotti, supra note 25 (noting that higher-income communities can
draw on local professionals to volunteer their time). Additionally,
communities with little access or appeal to public interest groups are likely to
suffer inordinately from this scarcity of resources. See Spyke, supra note 3, at
275 (examining the role of public interest groups in public participation
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the city may be inclined to provide assistance to certain
communities, while ignoring others.50 The City Planning
Commission’s discretion in deciding which communities receive
assistance strips the 197-a process of any real chance to
encourage meaningful dialogue between the city and
communities, especially if that discretion is abused.
The 197-a planning process suffers from an overall lack of
emphasis on inclusive public participation. Of the pages of rules
promulgated by the Commission, only a single sentence is
devoted to public participation, requiring that “[p]lans shall be
accompanied by documentation of the public participation in their
formulation and preparation, such as workshops, hearings, or
technical advisory committees.”51 This suggests merely that
hearings or forums be held, but does not require inclusiveness.
The rules do not mandate, for instance, that all members of the
community are informed of the public forum or that all languages
spoken in the community are employed at the meetings or in the
announcements.52
IV. TWO CASE STUDIES
The following case studies provide chronological narratives
of two communities’ efforts to formulate and present workable
zoning plans.53 The case study method has obvious shortcomings:
programs).
50
See infra Part IV (illustrating that Vinegar Hill received more support
from the city in its planning process than Greenpoint and arguing that this was
due to the relative, differing appeal of the communities).
51
62 R.C.N.Y. § 6-04(a)(7) (2002).
52
The case studies examined in this article demonstrate the importance of
meaningful public participation requirements that evince consensus building
and inclusion to insure a democratic land use decision-making scheme and
highlight that language barriers and dissemination of planning information can
impact community efforts. See infra Parts IV.A-B (discussing population
diversity).
53
The narratives set forth are based on planning documents, records from
community meetings, area demographics, city decision-making standards,
neighborhood histories, newspaper accounts of neighborhood transformations,
and numerous interviews conducted by the author and other investigators with
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it is by definition narrow in focus and largely anecdotal.54
Additionally, these are only two of the sixteen 197-a plans in
various stages of planning in New York City since the Charter
amendment.55 Thus, these narratives do not purport to reflect the
general outcome of 197-a plans. They do, however, point out
weaknesses in the current 197-a process and the public
participation mechanisms currently in place. If nothing else, these
narratives illustrate that the current process has failed to live up
to its goal of encouraging and fostering community-sponsored
planning.
A. Vinegar Hill, Brooklyn
The community of Vinegar Hill is a relatively small
neighborhood and part of Brooklyn’s Community Board 2.56 The
community activists, city employees, planners and residents. The narratives
are not exhaustive, but attempt to re-create the sequence of events from each
community’s initial decision to actively plan neighborhood development to the
official land use decisions that resulted from the community’s involvement.
54
See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Case Studies in Legal Ethics:
Telling Stories in School: Using Case Studies and Stories to Teach Legal
Ethics, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 787 (2000) (discussing the benefits of the use of
the case study to enhance the examination of ethical and moral issues in the
practice of law). Professor Menkel-Meadow describes the tension that exists
between stories and rules, narratives and principles. Id. She questions, for
example, the purpose of rules and principles if they can always be argued
against in a particular instance. Id. at 794. She also acknowledges that the case
study method raises the problem of choice of story and voice. Id. See also
Kathryn Hendley, Economic, Legal and Political Dilemmas of Privatization in
Russia: The Spillover Effects of Privatization on Russian Legal Culture, 5
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 51 (1995) (acknowledging that the
case study approach yields limited data from which it is problematic to draw
any general conclusions).
55
MAS, STATE OF 197-A PLANNING, supra note 26, at 24; see also NYC
Dep’t of City Planning Website, supra note 22 (listing seven 197-a plans that
have been adopted as of October 18, 2002: Bronx Community District 3,
Chelsea, Red Hook, Stuyvesant Cove, Comprehensive Manhattan Waterfront,
Greenpoint, and Williamsburg).
56
See NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, VINEGAR HILL
ZONING STUDY 2 (May 1996) [hereinafter NYC ZONING STUDY, VINEGAR
HILL]. The Department of City Planning undertook and completed a zoning
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area is just east of the Manhattan Bridge, and bordered by Bridge
Street on the south, Plymouth Street on the west, the Brooklyn
Navy Yard on the north and York Street on the east.57 Although
close in proximity to downtown Manhattan and downtown
Brooklyn, it is not well serviced by public transportation.58 The
history of the neighborhood is a familiar one along Brooklyn’s
waterfront—the neighborhood was predominantly an enclave for
Irish workers in the 1800s, resulting in residential wood-frame
houses and some brownstones lining the cobblestone streets next
to light industrial warehouses along the East River.59 The general
study of Vinegar Hill in 1996 to determine if it was appropriate to rezone
areas within the neighborhood to a residential district with commercial
overlays, in order to complement efforts of the Landmarks Preservation
Commission. Id. at 1. The Department articulated that Vinegar Hill spans
fifteen acres, or eight city blocks. Id. at 2. Community Board 2 is an area that
contains many neighborhoods, including the Downtown Brooklyn Business
District, Atlantic Center and six Historic Landmark Districts such as Brooklyn
Heights, Boerum Hill and Fort Greene. See COMMUNITY DISTRICT NEEDS,
supra note 46, at 47.
57
See NYC ZONING STUDY, VINEGAR HILL, supra note 56, at 1.
58
See id. at 4 (noting that “mass transit access to the area is very limited.
There is only one subway and three bus lines which directly serve the study
area.”).
59
Id. at 2; see also MARCIA REISS, FULTON FERRY LANDING, DUMBO,
VINEGAR HILL NEIGHBORHOOD HISTORY GUIDE (2001). Vinegar Hill’s origins
date back to the early 1800s. By naming the neighborhood after Vinegar Hill
in Ireland, the site of the 1798 Irish Rebellion against the British, the
developer hoped to attract the large number of Irish immigrants flowing into
the country. For an enlightening description of Vinegar Hill’s history, see
New
York
Street
Scenes,
http://www.forgottenat
ny.com/STREET%20SCENES/Vinegar%20 Hill%20Page/vinegar.html (last
visited Jan. 1, 2003); see also Names of New York, Vinegar Hill, at
http://www.newsday.
com/features/custom/names/ny-namesofnyvinegarhill,0,1560754.htmlstory (last visited Nov. 11, 2002). In the twentieth
century, the neighborhood enjoyed residual revenue from the nearby Naval
yard. Id. But when the Navy decommissioned the yard in 1966, the
neighborhood declined into poverty. Id. Today Vinegar Hill occupies only a
small strip of land consisting of mainly nineteenth century row houses, located
next to the DUMBO district of Brooklyn. Id. However, the neighborhood is
thought to be on the rise again, as the area is now considered an enclave for
artists. Id. A recent census shows that currently over 4,000 people live in the
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decline of waterfront industry after World War II led to
abandonment of the area, as was occurring in other waterfront
sections of Brooklyn.60 In the early 1970s, a burgeoning artists’
movement set up residential and working studios in the vacant
industrial lofts and refurbished the nineteenth century row
houses.61 This resulted in a small, politically active group of
inhabitants.62 In 1998, the population of Vinegar Hill was
estimated at around 225 residents.63 The neighborhood has 12
businesses employing over 650 people.64 Real estate
advertisements in a recent New York Times listed two-bedroom
cooperative apartments in the area as selling for over $1
Vinegar Hill area. See Enclave Links Its Political Fate to Its Rich History,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2002, at B1; see also Real Estate Scene Vinegar Hill
Aging Well, Downtown’s a Tiny Outpost of the Past, DAILY NEWS, Aug. 17,
2000, at 14.
60
See NYC ZONING STUDY, VINEGAR HILL, supra note 56, at 2
(discussing the Navy’s abandonment of the Brooklyn waterfront as leading to
“the gradual deterioration of the surrounding area”).
61
See Mary Miuccio, Vinegar Hill is Like a Small Town in New England,
Its Residents Say, BROOKLYN PAPER, Oct. 3-15, 1979, at 12. Writing in 1979,
Miuccio noted “approximately eight years ago, some artsy, speculative and
gutsy people moved into [Vinegar Hill] and started purchasing abandoned
buildings and warehouses.” Id.
62
See id. (noting that “besides investing manual labor and money, the
new immigrants to the area joined with the few remaining original neighbors
to fight industrial legal battle”); see also Peter Haley, They Put the Vinegar
Back in the Hill, and Fought City Hall, PHOENIX, Nov. 30, 1978, at 11. Haley
commented, “through the combined efforts of newcomers and longtime
residents, this urban village of industrial lofts and three- and four-story brick
buildings is making a comeback.” Id. He also noted that “[a]rtists seeking low
rents and space turned out to be the secret weapon” in Vinegar Hill’s struggle,
and his interviews with local residents “related how residents banded together”
to protect local homeowners. Id. at 13
63
See Amy Waldman, The 2nd Battle of Vinegar Hill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
1, 1998 at CY8. “Vinegar Hill is roughly nine square blocks, with perhaps
225 residents and about 19 commercial or manufacturing buildings, a well as a
sprinkling of mom-and-pop stores.” Id.
64
Jonathan Bowles, Zones of Contention, CITY LIMITS, Nov. 2000, at 21.
Bowles noted that, at most recent count, “there were about 52 homes and 12
businesses employing roughly 650 people in this tiny neighborhood.” Id. at
24.
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million.65
The 2000 demographics for the surrounding areas of
Community Board 2 revealed a primarily black and white
nonhispanic total population of 98,620.66 Approximately 7,692
residents are not citizens.67 Seventy-four percent of the occupied
housing units are rentals.68 Less than a quarter of the total
Community Board speaks a language other than English at home,
and fewer reported that they do not speak English “very well.”69
A small percentage of the population is assisted by government
income support.70 Community Board 2 also includes some of
Brooklyn’s most affluent communities, and the median household
income is $44,180,71 compared to a city-wide median of
$39,293.72
Prior to 1998, Vinegar Hill was zoned primarily for industrial
use with residential buildings existing as nonconforming uses.73
65

Real Estate Classifieds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002.
The black population is estimated at 40.5%, with white nonhispanic
residents averaging 34.4%. See NYC Department of City Planning,
Community District Profile, Brooklyn Community District 2 Website,
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/lucds/bk2lu.html (last visited
Dec.31, 2002).
67
See New York City Department of City Planning, Socioeconomic
Profiles 1980/1990 Census, Population and Housing 132-37 (Mar. 1993).
[hereinafter NYC PROFILE, COMM. BD. 2]. Statistics were not available for
2000 as of the date of publication.
68
Id. at 131.
69
A reported 23% speak a language other than English at home and 9.4%
of the Community Board population reported that they do no speak English
“very well.” Id. at 126.
70
17.4% reported receiving government income support. Id.
71
See HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN 1999 NEW YORK CITY COMMUNITY
DISTRICTS, TABLE SF3 INC P-301 (2000), available at http://www.nyc.gov/
html/dcp/pdf/census/sf3incp301.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2003).
72
Id.
73
See NEW YORK CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, Calendar no. 14,
C980067 ZMK at 1 (Jan. 21, 1998) [hereinafter “CITY PLANNING
COMMISSION FINAL REPORT”]. On January 21, 1998, the Department of City
Planning issued a final report on the application for an amendment of the
zoning map and regulations of Vinegar Hill as filed by the Department on July
31, 1997. Id. See also Bowles, supra note 64, at 24 (noting that “[r]esidents
66
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Two blocks were zoned for heavy manufacturing, M3-1, which
allows for heavy industrial uses, more objectionable hazards and
lower performance standards.74 The remainder of the
neighborhood was zoned for light manufacturing, M1-2, which
allows for a wide range of manufacturing but with higher
performance standards.75 In addition to the nonconforming row
houses,76 other zoning discrepancies exist, due largely to
conversions of warehouses into live-work loft space.77
This pattern persists in many areas along urban waterfronts,
where zoning regulations are remnants of the era of industry on
the rivers.78 Loft conversions are representative of today’s urban
and manufacturers managed to coexist for decades; while the area was long
zoned M-3, clusters of 19th century rowhouses were allowed to stand amid the
industry as a ‘nonconforming use.’”).
74
See generally CITY PLANNING COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note
73, at 1. New York City is divided into three basic zoning district: residential
(R), commercial (C), and manufacturing (M). The three basic categories are
further subdivided by the intensity of use, whether for retail or manufacturing
categories, parking, building bulk or residential density. Manufacturing uses
and certain intense commercial uses are subject to performance standards that
limit noise, air pollution and other nuisance-creating activity. These zoning
controls provide minimum acceptable standards and are designed to provide
building occupants and the general public with light, air and ventilation and a
safer, more livable environment. For a full description of zoning regulations
and standards in New York City, see NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY
PLANNING, NEW YORK CITY ZONING, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
dcp/html/zone/ zonetext.html (Sept. 25, 2002) (setting forth the Web version
of the Zoning Resolution of the City of New York including all text
amendments approved by the City Council).
75
See id. This zoning classification is often a buffer between residential
and heavier manufacturing zones. Id.
76
NYC ZONING STUDY, VINEGAR HILL, supra note 56, at 2-3.
77
Id. at 3 (“The predominant landuse in the area is industrial with a
scattering of residential uses. However, over the years there have been
residential conversions in the loft buildings.”). See also Haley, supra note 62,
at 13 (pointing out that “[a]rtists seeking low rents and space turned out to be
the secret weapon in the struggle for real estate” in Vinegar Hill).
78
See, e.g., Lisa Haarlander, Lofty Living: Eight Buildings in Downtown
Area Being Converted Into New Apartments, BUFF. NEWS, Apr. 15, 2002, at
C1 (noting the rise in the trend and frequency in conversion of industrial and
warehouse space into residential lofts in urban areas); Benjamin Forgey,
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society, where commercial shipping is more road-based and
industrial installations along urban waterfronts are no longer
necessary for industrial shipping.79 This is not to suggest that the
manufacturing zones are obsolete; they do, and must continue to,
house small manufacturers and essential noxious operations, but
the importance of waterfront access is lessened. Vinegar Hill is
also home to a waste treatment equipment storage facility, Con
Edison property and various distribution and small manufacturing
centers.80
Discussion of changes in the area began appearing in the
media in the late 1970s; one commentator characterized it as a
neighborhood comeback generated by “the combined efforts of
newcomers and longtime residents.”81 To orchestrate the
comeback, area residents lobbied then City Councilman Abe
Gerges and State Assemblyman Harvey Strelzin to include
Vinegar Hill in Mayor Koch’s list of areas marked for lowinterest federal renovation loans.82 This allowed many residents
to buy and repair row houses in the area and establish a
residential core.83
Vinegar Hill residents faded from activism until the mid1990s, when a waste treatment company bought the property of a
Uncovering the Waterfront, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1994, at G01 (commenting
on the rise in conversion of Naval and industrial installations and stating that
“[t]he urban waterfront is being transformed worldwide—and, in large part,
for the better”); Robert Marchant, Housing Planned in Former Electric Plant:
Developer Plans Waterfront Apartments in Vacant Structure, J. NEWS, Mar.
25, 2002, at B (noting urban trends towards “converting [ ] old industrial
infrastructure on the waterfront to new uses—such as a new park, and a
library and apartments converted from [ ] old factor[ies]”).
79
See generally supra note 78 (noting the rise in conversion of urban
waterfront industrial fixtures into new uses).
80
NYC ZONING STUDY, VINEGAR HILL, supra note 56, at 2-3.
81
Haley, supra note 62, at 13.
82
Id. at 1-3 (noting that lobbying efforts convinced the mayor’s office to
grant renovation loans to Vinegar Hill).
83
See generally id. at 1. Haley commented that the “most obvious sign of
comeback has been Mayor Ed Koch’s announcement that Vinegar Hill will be
among 22 neighborhoods in the city designated for a new federal housing loan
program aimed at small homeowners.” Id.
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135-year-old neighborhood church and demolished it to use the
space for equipment storage.84 Though the church was defunct,
the action generated neighborhood uproar that encouraged
Community Board 2 to establish a special task force to explore
possible 197-a plans for the area.85 The neighborhood began a
197-a planning process in 1995.86 Although the 197-a plan was
never completed, the area won landmark status in 1997, when the
Landmarks Preservation Commission (“LPC”) proposed historic
designation for the area’s row houses.87 The Department of City
Planning undertook a zoning study of the area “to determine if it
is appropriate to rezone areas within Vinegar Hill to a residential
district with commercial overlays, in order to compliment the
efforts of the LPC.”88 This study was similar to a 197-a plan, but
was sponsored by the Department of City Planning itself, rather
than a community board. After formally studying the land use of
the area at the residents’ request, the City Planning Commission
proposed rezoning the area to residential.89 According to media
84

Waldman, supra note 63, at CY8 (noting that the demolition generated
public outcry and local rallying towards rezoning efforts); see also Merle
English, A Sweet Little Place Called Home; Vinegar Hill Is Little Known But
Well Loved By Residents, NEWSDAY, Sept. 20, 1992, at 2 (noting that
“Vinegar Hill came into the limelight recently when residents expressed
concern that St. Anne’s, a 132-year-old Catholic Church and the borough’s
oldest parish, was to be demolished to make way, some had heard, for a
garbage transfer plant”).
85
See Dennis Holt, Vinegar Hill and DUMBO are Subjects of CB2 Task
Force, PHOENIX, Jan. 29, 1996. According to Holt, there was “no dispute as
to why the study [was] under way,” and his articulation of the Task Force’s
purpose statement reveals that razing of “historic buildings and streets” along
with the desire to revise “outmoded zoning” for increased residential space
prompted the organized effort. Id.
86
See MAS, STATE OF 197-A PLANNING, supra note 26, at 24.
87
See Bowles, supra note 64, at 23-24 (noting that city council members
sought and achieved landmark status for Vinegar Hill architecture and that
these efforts played a role in gaining official neighborhood recognition by the
city); see also CITY PLANNING COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 73, at
2.
88
NYC ZONING STUDY, VINEGAR HILL, supra note 56, at 1.
89
See generally CITY PLANNING COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note
73, for a full review of the rezoning proposals adopted by the City Planning
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reports, the City Planning Commission’s proposal was intended
to block the possibility of subsequent sitings of waste treatment
stations in the area, a major concern of the residents.90
Public debates and hearings on the rezoning included vocal
groups representing various viewpoints.91 Area businesses
vigorously opposed the rezoning proposal because they feared
forcible relocation, loss of the right to expand and limitations on
the resale value of their property.92 The rezoning was also
controversial because of perceived ties to a separate plan to
Commission.
90
Philip Lentz, Vinegar Hill Zoning Plan Puts Businesses in a Pickle,
CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Dec. 15, 1997, at 16 (noting that “City Planning
Commissioner Joseph Rose says the administration was motivated by the
concern over greater transfer station activity in the neighborhood.”); see also
Waldman, supra note 63, at CY8 (stating that “city officials said the rezoning
was motivated in large part by the fear that Tocci Brothers would start treating
waste on the lot, across the street from a row of historic houses.”).
91
See, e.g., Bill Farrell, Vinegar Hill Eyes Future Decisions on Zoning,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 24, 1997. Farrell notes that “[b]uilders, residents
and city planners all with separate visions [were] joining the debate about the
area’s future.” Id. He quotes and articulates the varying concerns of each
constituency, noting, ultimately, that “two proposed zoning changes being
debated would spur dramatic changes, if approved, along a stretch of Brooklyn
waterfront.” Id.
92
See Lentz, supra note 90 (noting fears of existing businesses that
“rezoning would make it harder for them to obtain financing and grow, which
could eventually force them to move.”); Bowles, supra note 64, at 24.
According to Bowles, local manufacturers were “backed into a corner” by the
rezoning and would “need special permits to expand.” Id. He cites comments
by several industrial leaders as fearing growth limitations due to the rezoning,
despite the fact that the businesses were “grandfathered in under the old
zoning.” Id.
Such disputes between residents and businesses are common around plans
that rezone from manufacturing to residential. See, e.g., Daniel Lee, Bi-Mart
Project Faces New Challenges, COLUMBIAN, May 2, 2000 at b1 (noting that
the building project “has followed a long road filled with council debate and
challenges by rivals”); Martha Ezzard, Woman’s Touch Could be Just Right to
Handle Growth, ATL. JOURNAL AND CONST., Dec. 13, 1998 at 1C (stating
that plans envisioning mixed use zoning are being abused by developers who
take advantage of mixed use zoning by developing the commercial and not the
residential areas).
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develop the waterfront area, thus worrying some newer residents
that excessive revitalization would drive them out.93 Dissension
came to a head at the Community Board meeting on October 8,
1997.94 The meeting ended without a vote.95 At a November 20,
1997 public hearing, held by then-Brooklyn Borough President
Howard Golden, eighteen speakers testified in opposition to the
proposed zoning amendment, twenty-four speakers testified in
favor, and the Chairperson of Community Board 2 took no
position.96 The City Planning Commission’s account of the final
public hearing on December 3, 1997 reveals that the residents’
position was somewhat better represented, but a substantial
amount of opposition from community businesses remained.97
The Commission adopted the rezoning on January 21, 1998.98
The Commission’s report summed up the residents’ concerns
such as “the need to preserve the fragile but historic housing
stock of Vinegar Hill, the friction between heavy truck traffic,
related industrial uses, and the narrow residential-scale streets
and street furniture, as well as the threat of expansion of waste
transfer industry.”99 The report described the opposition’s
concern that rezoning would have “a detrimental effect on the
jobs in the area, and create hardships for the businesses that
might want to expand or sell their property to other businesses in

93

See generally Lentz, supra note 90 (noting the varying, ultimately
irreconcilable, visions and hopes of Vinegar Hill entrepreneurs and residents).
94
See Dennis Holt, Board 2 Unable to Resolve Condo Vinegar Hill Issues
at Meeting, PHOENIX, Oct. 10, 1997 (noting the “futility and confusion” that
haunted past meetings was present at the “stormy” October 8th meeting
discussing the two controversial zoning issues).
95
Id. The board could not conduct any business at the meeting because it
lacked a quorum. Id.
96
See CITY PLANNING COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 79.
97
See id. at 8-9. Specifically, speakers in favor included 14 residents of
Vinegar Hill and the surrounding area, an owner of a business in the rezoning
area, a representative of the Historic Council, and state senate and assembly
members representatives. Id. There were 10 speakers in opposition. Id.
98
See id. at 13.
99
Id. at 8-9.
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the future.”100 The Commission’s report stressed the historic
designation of the area, claiming that the zoning amendments
“would bring existing nonconforming residences into
conformance; allow for the development of vacant property in
keeping with the existing bulk and character of the area; and
reinforce the historic character of predominantly residential
buildings.”101 The final rezoning reflected some consideration of
the businesses’ concerns as well, reducing the area to be downzoned from light manufacturing to residential use.102 This
reduction allowed four “light industrial/commercial” uses of
twelve to remain active, including a toy manufacturing and
import company, a moving company, an equipment storage
business and a restaurant supply manufacturer.103 The report did
not explain why these particular revisions were made, other than
the Commission’s desire to retain “viable manufacturing jobs in
the City.”104
The community of Vinegar Hill never submitted a 197-a
plan.105 The present zoning in Vinegar Hill is a direct result of
100

Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
102
CITY PLANNING COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 12-13.
The area was down-zoned from M1-2 to R6A and R6B. Id. Code designations
are numbered levels within each zoning. Id. These numbers correspond to
height, space, and other infrastructure-based requirements necessary for the
zoning code. Id.
103
Id. at 11.
104
Id. at 10.
105
See COMMUNITY DISTRICT NEEDS, supra note 46, at 55. Community
Board 2 is currently discussing a comprehensive plan for the entire waterfront,
encompassing the Navy Yard, Empire State Park, Fulton Ferry Landing and
Piers 1-5. Id. Moreover, there is much talk in the media of developing
residential cooperative apartments and high-end retail and entertainment
complexes in the areas immediately adjacent to Vinegar Hill. See Nadine
Brozan, One a Rental, the Other Condo and Commercial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
4, 2001 (discussing real estate plans by developer David C. Walentas, who has
owned large chunks of land in the area and worked to revitalize the
community); see also Lore Croghan, Real Estate Watch: Secret’s Out About
Move to Brooklyn, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUSINESS, Jan. 21, 2002, at 1 (identifying
large industrial and business tenants moving to northern Brooklyn
neighborhoods).
101
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the alliance between residents and politicians, as well as a
development trend that began in the mid-1990s.106 By 1995, most
of the area was zoned for residential use, with a light
manufacturing zone buffer occupying the former heavy
manufacturing zoning designation.107 There remains a one-block
commercial overlay.108
B. Greenpoint, Brooklyn
Greenpoint is another Brooklyn community with a long
history of planning activism, albeit with many more hurdles to
overcome than Vinegar Hill. Set in Community Board 1,
Greenpoint is bound by the East River on the west, Newton
Creek on the north, the Brooklyn-Queen’s Expressway on the
east and southeast, and McCarren Park on the south.109 The area
is primarily comprised of three enclaves: the Polish community,
the Latino community and a newer community of young artists
attracted by low rents.110 Public transportation in and out of
106

See Bowles, supra note 64, at 24 (noting that efforts to protect
waterfront neighborhoods from industrial development by residential and
mixed-use rezoning has locked out businesses helpful to the Brooklyn
economy); see also Penny Lee, East River Information Session, East River
Project, Van Alen Institute, available at http://www.vanalen.org/forums/er_
info.htm (highlighting several projects on the Queens waterfront that
successfully incorporated both business and community interests).
107
NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, ZONING MAP 12c (1995)
(showing M3-1 zoning replaced by M1-2).
108
Id. This commercial section is zoned C2-4. Id.
109
See New York City Department of City Planning Website, Comm.
Dist. Profile: Brooklyn, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/
lucds/bk1lu. html#data (last visited Nov. 12, 2002). Community Board 1
consists of Greenpoint and Williamsburg. See GREENPOINT 197-A
COMMITTEE, GREENPOINT 197-A PLAN 39 (June 1998) [hereinafter PROPOSED
GREENPOINT 197-A].
110
See generally Tom Gilbert, Greetings from Greenpoint, BROOKLYN
BRIDGE, Sept./Oct. 1999, at 90. Gilbert’s article describes the rich, vibrant
Polish community of Greenpoint, including many Polish shops and
restaurants, as well as the “significant” Hispanic community with “just under
20 percent” of the area’s residents identifying themselves as such in the 1990
census. Id. at 90-95, 90. According to Gilbert “[n]ew settlers” in Greenpoint
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Greenpoint is limited to two stops on the “G” train, one farther
stop on the Manhattan bound “L” train and three bus lines.111
Greenpoint has a strong infrastructure—many neighborhood
businesses, a thriving main street and multi-generational
families.112 Greenpoint has roughly 36,700 residents, and its
population is predominantly white, nonhispanic.113 Greenpoint’s
workforce participation makes up a larger percentage of its total
population than that of Brooklyn or New York City as a whole.114
It is considered a “working neighborhood,” and local residents
staff many of Greenpoint’s manufacturing plants, mostly in the
are “often artists” that were outsted from Manhattan by high rents and there is
a “burgeoning artist community” in the neighborhood. Id. at 96. See also
PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 18 (discussing the change in
Greenpoint’s ethnic composition due to immigration in the 1990s);
COMMUNITY DISTRICT NEEDS, supra note 46, at 17 (noting that “Greenpoint
and Williamsburg contain within them an almost unparalleled variety of
cultural, religious, racial and ethnic groups, who reside in several distinct
communities”).
111
PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 58.
112
See id. at 3. It has been noted that “Greenpoint has many families that
have lived there for three or more generations. Those families sustain
Greenpoint’s tradition and folklore.” Id.; See also Gilbert, supra note 110, at
90 (noting that although Greenpoint has experienced recent variations and
shifts in demographics, these shifts are “merely variations on economic and
cultural experiences familiar to both fourth-generation families and
newcomers”).
113
See NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, SOCIOECONOMIC
PROFILES - 1980 / 1990 CENSUS, POPULATION AND HOUSING 126-31 (Mar.
1993) [hereinafter NYC PROFILE, COMM. BD. 1]. Greenpoint’s population
was listed as approximately 73.2% white, nonhispanic in 1990. Id. “Although
the percentage of Blacks and Asians in Greenpoint rose in the 1980s, their
share of Greenpoint’s population “remains modest” and the number of Asians
increased from 2.2% of the population in 1980 to 3.5% in 1990, and the Black
population doubled its numbers in the same time, though it still remains small
(only 1.2% and 3.5% of the total population respectively in 1990).”
PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 17. As of the date of
publication, the 2000 Census reports broken down by neighborhood had not
been released.
114
See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 35.
Greenpoint’s workforce is 65% of its total population, whereas that of
Brooklyn is 58.9% and New York City as a whole is listed at 61.7%. Id.
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woodworking and textile industries.115
According to the 2000 Census, Community Board 1 has a
total population of 160,338, with a majority white, nonhispanic
(48%) or Hispanic (37.7%) in origin.116 Of the residents of
Community Board 1, 17% are not citizens.117 Roughly two-thirds
speak a language other than English at home, and 38.5% report
that they do not speak English “very well.”118 The average
median household income in 2000 was $26,325.119 Roughly onethird of the population receives government income assistance.120
A majority of the community’s housing units are rentals.121
Historically, the zoning designations along Greenpoint’s
waterfront were similar to Vinegar Hill, with properties along the
water zoned for industry, and residential properties located just
inland from the industrial area.122 The entire stretch of
115

Id. The “businesses and jobs” profile of Greenpoint’s proposed 197-a
plan stated that “among the many small-scale industries, it appears that craftrelated manufacturing, in particular wood-working, thrives in Greenpoint.” Id.
Additionally, “other industries that currently prosper in Greenpoint include
furniture manufacturers, lumber wholesalers, precision machinery makers, the
textile industry, and others. Many of the jobs in these industries are filled by
Greenpoint residents.” Id.
116
See N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning, Comm. Dist. Profile: Brooklyn
CD 1: Greenpoint, Williamsburg, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/
html/lucds/bk1lu.html#data (last visited Nov. 12, 2002).
117
NYC PROFILE, COMM. BD. 1, supra note 113, at 126.
118
Id. Specifically, 69.7% speak a language other than English in the
home. Id.
119
See NYC Dep’t. of City Planning Website, supra note 22. This figure
is relatively low, compared to the city-wide median household income of
$39,293.
120
Id. The percentage of the population receiving government assistance
was reported as 32.9%.
121
See NYC PROFILE, COMM. BD. 1, supra note 113, at 131.
Approximately 86% of the housing units are rentals.
122
See generally PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 20-24
(reviewing the existing zoning and land use standards in Greenpoint). Such a
mixed-use plan is typical of old New York, where industry depended on rivers
for shipping and workers lived near their jobs. Id. Greenpoint’s proposed plan
specifically points out that “a number of factors have left the waterfront
underutilized, including the shift away from manufacturing towards a service-
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Greenpoint’s waterways is zoned M3-1 for heavy manufacturing
with a lighter manufacturing M1-1 buffer zone immediately
inland.123 There is an R-6 residential zone approximately three
blocks from all water access.124 As in Vinegar Hill, there are
nonconforming
residential
structures
in
Greenpoint’s
125
manufacturing zones.
Ad hoc zoning decisions and illegal
conversions have created environmentally unsafe and inefficient
conditions.126 Many of the heavy manufacturing M-3 zones are
vacant or illegal residential conversions, while the M1 “buffer”
zones contain both light manufacturing and residential uses.127
There are also some pre-existing nonconforming uses of light
manufacturing in residential zones.128 Compared to the rest of
New York City neighborhoods, Greenpoint houses an inordinate
amount of essential, yet locally undesirable, land uses.129 These
based economy, containerization of the shipbuilding industry, and trucking as
a means of shipping.” Id. at 20.
123
See id. The buffer zone is occupied by both residential and light
manufacturing uses. Id.
124
Id. at 22. (noting that “[a]t the core of the Greenpoint neighborhood
lies the R-6 medium density residential zone”).
125
Id. at 20. The proposed plan notes that “an increasing amount of
conversion from manufacturing to residential has taken place, in particular in
the loft buildings near the East River.” Id. As noted, this pattern is consistent
with that in Vinegar Hill and many urban waterfront installations. See supra
note 78 (reviewing recent trends in development along urban waterfronts).
126
Id. at 32. According to the proposed plan, “recent conversion—illegal
and legal—of manufacturing lofts to live and work lofts has increased the level
of residential non-compliant uses.” Id. Rezoning these areas to mixed-use
zones “would limit industrial expansion to those business[es] that enter into
good neighbor agreements and that can demonstrate that they can meet strict
environmental performance standards” and foster “a healthier and more
desirable community.” Id.
127
See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 20. The
occupied buffer zones are a distinct contrast to the largely vacant parcels of
land along the East River waterfront and 20 vacant acres of land including
piers and the Greenpoint Terminal Market site. Id.
128
Id. at 20. The proposed plan notes that “some light manufacturing still
occurs in pre-exisiting non-conforming uses within residential zones.” Id.
129
See generally id. at 26-32. The proposed plan describes and catalogues
a number of businesses that moved into the spaces abandoned by ship builders
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include the city’s largest wastewater treatment facility, nine waste
transfer stations, and numerous petroleum and natural gas storage
facilities.130
Greenpoint won some historic designation status in 1982, but
that designation did not seem to affect the community’s ability to
rezone.131 At that point, the area was known as
Greenpoint/Williamsburg.132 Community Board 1 began a
planning process with local residents and Columbia University’s
Urban Planning Studio in 1985.133 The results of this process
were eventually compiled in a “Policy and Resource Handbook”
which, despite providing residents with a helpful introduction to
the idea of community planning, rendered no concrete results. 134
Community involvement in the Greenpoint/Williamsburg plan
began in earnest in 1989 with open meetings facilitated by
Community Board 1.135 Community involvement initially
revolved around environmental issues, and the New York City
Department of Environmental Protection initiated the
and lumberyards that “once crowded Greenpoint’s shores.” Id. at 26. These
include, for example, “a growing number of public and private facilities such
as waste transfer stations, a sewage treatment plant, the former municipal
incinerator, the marine transfer station, and a range of facilities suspected of
storing hazardous substances.” Id.
130
See id. at 28.
131
See Policy and Resource Handbook for Waterfront Development, 1
COLUMBIA URBAN PLANNING STUDIO 24 (1987) [hereinafter COLUMBIA
HANDBOOK] (noting that “[t]he Landmarks Preservation Commission report
on Greenpoint emphasizes the historical significance of the surviving 19thcentury workers’ housing and original commercial buildings along Franklin
Street”).
132
Williamsburg is the neighborhood just south of Greenpoint, also
bordering the East River. See New York City Department of City Planning,
Zoning Map 12d, 13b.
133
See generally COLUMBIA HANDBOOK, supra note 131. The completed
handbook sets forth the planning goals and visions of Greenpoint’s residents
and the desire to implement renovation efforts within the neighborhood. Id.
134
As noted, the handbook was a student project and, as such, had no
binding authority on city agencies. Id.
135
See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 8. Five open
meetings were held, “facilitated by a planning firm hired by the Community
Board.” Id.
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Environmental Benefits Program (“EBP”) to assess the
environmental health of Greenpoint/Williamsburg.136 The EBP
was funded by a settlement with the Newton Creek Sewage
Treatment Plant.137 This program was originally touted by all as a
136

See Nancy E. Anderson, Notes from the Front Line, 21 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 757, 768-69 (1994) (noting that this program was designed to
address urban environmental issues in a community-based manner); see also
Hillary Gross et al., Environmental Justice: A Review of State Responses, 8
HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 41, 62 (2001) (noting that the
Environmental Benefits Program was a program that operated between 1991
and 1994, focusing exclusively on the Greenpoint/Williamsburg
neighborhood). The EBP dealt with environmental justice concerns by
attempting to engage area residents to help define, develop, and implement
solutions to their environmental problems and by allowing them to participate
in the city’s decision-making process. Id.; see also Robert W. Collin & Robin
Morris Collin, The Role of Communities in Environmental Decisions:
Communities Speaking for Themselves, 13 ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 37, 79-80
(1998) (explaining that the EBP operated from the office of a Community
Watchperson and included resident-based monitoring and research using
residents to collect information to supplement an epidemiological study of
pollution, disease, and mortality in the neighborhood); Nancy E. Anderson,
The Visible Spectrum, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 723, 727-28 (1994) (describing
that the EBP was undertaken by the New York City Department of
Environmental Protection in order to address some of the inequities caused by
local sources of pollution in New York City and that “[t]his program may
serve as a model for other communities in the effort to address environmental
inequities”).
137
See Anderson, supra note 136, at 769; see also In re City of N.Y.
Dep’t Envtl. Prot., No. R2-3183-90-08, slip. op. at 3. In re City addressed
overcapacity problems at the STP. Id. The STP’s sewage flow exceeded its
permitted limit of 310 million gallons per day, and did not perform required
“secondary” levels of sewage treatment. Id. The Consent Order was designed
to solve these problems. Id. The North River case involved the problem of
noxious odors emanating from the plant and the need to control them. Id.; see
also Samara Swanston, Environmental Social Movements Since Love Canal, 8
BUFF. ENVTL. L. J. 283, 283-89 (2001). According to Swantson, the
Watchperson Project was formed as a result of a community initiative to use
an $850,000 fine imposed by the DEC on the Department of Environmental
Protection for New York City’s operation of the Newtown Creak Sewage
Treatment Plant in violation of the Clean Water Act. Id. Ultimately, the DEC
imposed a fine as a result of communities’ vigorous complaints about the
odors and other problems at the New York Creek sewage treatment plant. Id.
The Project also intervened when the Department of Sanitation did not require
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partnership effort between the city and the community, “the
environmental version of government by the people and for the
people.”138 It focused on information gathering and policy
making, with efforts to document the environmental problems
and enforce pollution prevention methods.139 Soon, however,
residents, environmental experts and planning experts criticized
the EBP as favoring evaluation over remediation.140 The residents
wrote a letter to the Department of Environmental Protection
expressing concern that the program was not working as a
partnership and that community issues were not being
addressed.141
While the EBP continued to amass data and develop a
cumulative risk methodology, residents concerned about
immediate effects formed coalitions to fight for enforcement and
remediation.142 Around this time, the Greenpoint/Williamsburg
environmental impact statements and the Department of Environmental
Conservation did not enforce the stipulation of settlement. Id.
138
See NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
GREENPOINT/WILLIAMSBURG ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS PROGRAM, at 2. See
also Gross et al., supra note 136, at 62 (discussing the EBP’s goal to involve
residents of the Greenpoint/Williamsburg neighborhood in responding to
environmental problems); see also Federal Funding Available for
Environmental Justice Issues in the Bronx, 39 NEW YORK VOICE,
INC./HARLEM USA 19 (August 16, 1995), available at 1995 WL 1544343
(describing the environmental benefits program as a “community-led
initiative” to become involved in environmental issues).
139
Id.
140
See, e.g., Manuel Perez-Rivas, Pollution Study is Muddy Issue, N. Y.
NEWSDAY, Feb. 23, 1992 (discussing criticism of the EBP plan to conduct a
$850,000 survey to assess the environmental damage instead of working on
prevention methodology); see also Anderson, supra note 136, at 728, 736
(discussing the debatable success of the EBP’s community mobilization effort
and skepticism expressed by residents of the community).
141
Letter from Steering Committee, to New York City Department of
Environmental Protection (May 7, 1993) (on file with author).
142
See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-a, supra note 109, at 3. Since the late
1950s Greenpoint residents have responded to the adverse effects of certain
public policies by filing petitions, testifying at hearings, and establishing
working groups and advisory committees. Id. at 3. Their efforts resulted in the
creation of the Greenpoint Plan, which provides a means for residents and city
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alliance split into two separate groups, precipitated in part by the
Department of City Planning’s identification of 22 subareas
within Community District 1 to be studied for possible rezoning
of manufacturing zones to permit residential development.143 One
of these subareas was in Williamsburg and became the first area
studied in detail by the Department of City Planning in 1996.144
With the help of a professional planner, Williamsburg residents
created a 197-a plan focusing on the waterfront area.145 This plan,
and the Department of City Planning’s study, led to the rezoning
of a subarea in Williamsburg in 1998 from an M3-1 heavy
manufacturing zone to a C4-3 high commercial area.146
agencies to discuss Greenpoint’s development and revival. See also Elizabeth
Hays, Power Plant Plan Jeered Greenpoint, Willliamsburg Activists Berate
Developer, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 25, 2001 (providing a contemporaneous
account of critiques leveled by Brooklyn residents upon development plans to
place a power plant in Greenpoint/Williamsburg); Elizabeth Hays, Greenpoint
Backs Burner Board 1 Fights Dismantling of Shutdown Incinerator, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 4, 2001 (indicating community support for efforts to
decrease industrial waste in Greenpoint); Elizabeth Hays, Greenpoint Fears
Power Ploy, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 28, 2001 (expressing general suspicion
by residents of political and economic motives of siting decisions).
143
See N. Y. CITY DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, WILLIAMSBURG BRIDGE
AREA ZONING STUDY, Sub-area 12, Phase II Report, May 1996, at 1
(describing the Department of City Planning’s identification of areas to be
studied to determine if manufacturing areas should be down-zoned to permit
residential development).
144
Id.
145
See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 14. Specifically,
“[t]he Williamsburg 197-a Plan focuses on a linear stretch of three
interconnected neighborhoods along the East River waterfront.” Id.
146
See NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, ZONING MAP 12d,
13b (indicating the zoning classifications for each section of Williamsburg).
Greenpoint was not addressed in Williamsburg’s 197-a plan. See PROPOSED
GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 14. Community Board One and local
community groups from Greenpoint and Williamsburg began to create a 197-a
plan to synthesize views and ideas in response to the pressures of increasing
demand for housing, decline of heavy manufacturing and increasing rents to
do illegal conversions to residential lofts. Id. Eventually, however, “[g]iven
the diversity of interests, issues, and the structural differences between the two
communities, it was determined that two 197-a Plans covering the two
geographically distinct areas of Williamsburg and Greenpoint should be
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At the same time, Greenpoint’s residents were vigorously
pursuing their own 197-a process with technical assistance and
resources from the Pratt Institute Center for Community and
Environmental Development.147 Earlier attempts at community
planning in Greenpoint were undermined by breakdowns in
communication between different groups—ethnic divisions
deepened, homeowners distanced themselves from renters,
residents quarreled with industry and environmentalists were at
odds with the labor force.148 As a result, prior proposals lost
momentum before reaching fruition.149
Because of the history of dissension among residents, the
197-a Steering Committee expanded its efforts to include all
members of the community throughout the 197-a process.150 The
prepared.” Id.
147
See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 8-13 (discussing
the planning process undertaken by Greenpoint residents and community
groups). Greenpoint’s 197-a plan “was refined and completed [ ] with
technical assistance and resources from the Pratt Institute Center for
Community and Environmental Development (“PICCED”) and with the
energy, commitment and sustained participation of members of Greenpoint’s
197-a Committee.” Id at 8. Both the Pratt Institute and the Columbia Planning
Studio have helped New York City neighborhoods compile data and prepare
community-based plans that emphasize localized interests and strengths. See
generally THE MUNICIPAL ARTS SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, THE WILL TO PLAN:
COMMUNITY INITIATED PLANNING IN NEW YORK CITY (Winter 1989-90), at
20-28 (noting assistance given by these institutes to local residents, committees
and advisory groups) (on file with author).
148
See generally Handhart Interview, supra note 18 (commenting that
efforts prior to contributions of technical assistance from the Pratt Institute
were hindered by communication breakdowns).
149
Id. (noting that no tangible results were reached by prior efforts); see
also PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 8 (noting the history of
Greenpoint’s planning process, including public forums and workshops, to
explore options and opinions as to what participants wanted to see develop
along Brooklyn’s waterfront but acknowledging that these efforts did not result
in a formal 197-a plan for Greenpoint).
150
The Steering Committee, formed with volunteer assistance from the
Pratt Institute, held numerous meetings, three major public forums, two
meetings with the business community and made presentations at open
meetings of Community Board One. Id. at 8-13. These events were advertised
via local newspapers and fliers printed in English, Spanish and Polish. Id. at
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Committee circulated a copy of the proposed plan door-to-door,
and a public forum was held to debate it.151 The forum attracted
about 150 participants and, in general, “the group expressed a
great deal of support” for the plan.152 In addition, two meetings
with the business community and two presentations at
Community Board meetings evinced virtually unanimous support
for the plan.153 Greenpoint’s final proposed plan innovatively
relies on mixed-use zoning and, rather than polarizing
commercial and environmental concerns, the community created
a plan that retains industry while monitoring and enforcing
environmental standards.154 Community Board One voted to
approve Greenpoint’s 197-a plan in 1998.155 The Department of
12. Follow-up workshops were also conducted with Hispanic and Polish
groups in their native languages. Id. For a full chronology and description of
these events, see id. at 8-13.
151
See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 8, 12. Over
9,000 copies of the “newspaper edition of the plan” were distributed
throughout the neighborhood. Id. at 12. In essence this distributed “almost one
copy per household to Greenpoint residents and businesses.” Id. at 8. The
forum was held on June 24, 1998. Id.
152
See id. at 12 (describing meetings with business leaders, public forums
and the support expressed for the plan).
153
Id. at 8; see also Telephone Interview with Ron Schiffman, Director,
Pratt Institute of Community and Environmental Development, (Nov. 22,
2000) [hereinafter Schiffman Interview] (explaining that the two dissenters to
the plan were Williamsburg residents who felt that Greenpoint’s boundary
should be extended to include them).
154
See generally PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 4060. The recommendations included in the proposed 197-a plan were intended
to “dramatically enhance Greenpoint’s environment by providing ecological
benefits to the neighborhood and by mitigating the impact of existing pollution
in accordance with the spirit and intent of the New York Charter [which] calls
for Fair Share Siting Criteria.” Id. at 40. The “Detailed Recommendations”
of the plan “are meant to encourage public access to the waterfront, low-rise
housing and commercial development while protecting Greenpoint’s
environment and quality of life.” Id. at 43. The proposed plan calls for
reduction of pollutants within the Charter’s criteria levels, decontamination of
hazardous sites, improvements of water quality as well as rezoning for future
commercial development. Id. at 43.
155
See DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, GREENPOINT 197-A PLAN Part
I, i (as modified and adopted by the City Planning Commission and the City
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City Planning received the final plan on February 3, 1999.156
Greenpoint’s 197-a Committee first met with city agencies on
February 22, 1999.157
At an August 23, 2000 public hearing on the Greenpoint plan,
there were sixteen speakers in favor of the plan and none
opposed.158 The plan was adopted on January 30, 2002, after
considerable modification by the Department of City Planning.159
Among the city’s positive modifications were the sections calling
for “halting expansion of the Greenpoint marine transfer station
beyond 2,215 tons per day, and reuse of the adjacent incinerator
site for public events and environmentally friendly purposes.”160
However, the city settled on terms that leave Greenpoint
residents vulnerable to new industrial uses. While the Greenpoint
community was lauded by the Department of City Planning for
its “collaborative approach in developing a 197-a plan responsive
to the concerns of Greenpoint’s residents and businesses and to
Council) (Spring 2002) [hereinafter ADOPTED GREENPOINT 197-A]. According
to the background summary of the City Planning Commission’s final, adopted
plan, the Board voted to approve the plan for agency review on October 14,
1998. Id.
156
Id. at Part I, 3 (noting that the plan was originally submitted on
October 21, 1998 and, after revisions for formatting and “other deficiencies”
were corrected, was submitted in revised format on February 3, 1999); See
also PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at i (indicating date
received by Central Intake Department of City Planning as February 3, 1999).
157
For a comprehensive list of meetings with government agencies, see
PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 13.
158
See ADOPTED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 155, at Part I, 6. This is
a striking comparison to Vinegar Hill’s final public hearing, which evinced
considerable opposition. See supra note 92 (noting the various dissenting
speakers and viewpoints offered at public meetings pertaining to Vinegar
Hill’s proposed rezoning).
159
See generally ADOPTED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 155, at Part I,
7-11. The adopted plan commends “the Board and its Waterfront Committee
for their collaborative approach in developing a 197-a plan” but specifically
declines to adopt provisions pertaining to the siting of waste management
facilities and substantially modifies the proposed plan as it pertains to
lessening adverse effectives of industry and waste management due to the
“citywide implications” of these provisions. Id. at Part I, 7-9.
160
Id. at Part I, 9.
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the issues raised by city agencies affected by the plan,” the city
nonetheless took many opportunities to weaken the outcome of
such a process.161 For example, it extended a moratorium on
sitings of waste transfer stations in Brooklyn’s Community
District 1 only until the adoption of the Department of
Sanitation’s (“DOS”) study of the city’s commercial waste
stream.162 The city also delayed re-zoning until comprehensive
city needs evaluations can be performed, leaving the waterfront
zoned M3-1 for heavy manufacturing in the interim.163
The present situation is chaotic as the community continues to
organize against new industrial and commercial development.164
New York City, while subject to a “fair share” requirement
dictating that publicly owned works be evenly distributed, does
not have guidelines in place for privately owned facilities.165
161

Id. at Part I, 9.
Id. at Part I, 3. The adopted plan notes that “City Council approval of
the NYC Solid Waste Management Plan Modification Plan on November 29,
2000 was contingent upon DOS undertaking a comprehensive study of the
city’s commercial waste stream. Id. at Part I, 9. In a separate agreement the
administration placed a moratorium on permitting any new putrescible or
nonputrescible waste transfer facilities in Brooklyn Community District One.
Id. at Part I, 8. It is unclear how long this moratorium will remain in effect.
163
Id. at Part I, 10. (recognizing rezoning requests in the proposed plan
but specifically declining to adopt these provisions and opting to establish and
“interagency task force to study the principle of high performance zoning on a
citywide basis”).
164
See Bowles, supra note 64, at 22. Bowles notes that “city planners
have been conspicuous in their absence” in Greenpoint and “so far, city
planning officials have resisted Greenpoint’s pleas for saner coexistence with
industry.” Id. He further points out that “residents in industrial neighborhoods
continue to stew amid a sea of M-3s—and increasingly, they are targeting
manufacturing itself as the enemy.” Id.
165
See 62 R.C.N.Y. App. A, Art. 3(a) (asserting that the “fair share”
requirement mandates the city to consider neighborhood compatibility and
character, cost-effectiveness, and compatibility with the mayor’s location
criteria when making decisions); see also Ferrer v. Dinkins, 218 A.D.2d 89
(N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (arguing that exclusion of privately run facilities from
the “fair share” provision “foster[s] neighborhood stability and revitalization
by furthering the fair distribution among communities of City facilities”);
Silver v. Dinkins, 601 N.Y.S.2d 366 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993), aff’d 602
N.Y.S.2d 540 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding that a proposed parking garage
162
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Currently, Greenpoint faces the development of a private power
plant.166 Thus, residents continue to organize and strategize, with
little tangible reward for their hard-earned, inclusive land use
decision-making process.
V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING
EFFORTS
An examination of the planning strategies and efforts of
Vinegar Hill and Greenpoint points out certain factors that may
influence the success of public participation. These can be broken
down into three categories: community demographics,
community access to resources, and the goals of proposed plans.
To encourage more public participation and comprehensive
planning, these factors should be addressed in a way that
equalizes each community’s ability to influence land use
decisions. Equal access to resources and, ideally, equal
consideration by the City Planning Commission could provide
fairer outcomes. Closer analysis of how each community
proceeded helps to suggest how such a solution might be
structured legislatively.
on Manhattan’s Lower East Side violated the “fair share” provision of the City
Charter); Cmty. Planning Bd. No. 4 v. Homes for the Homeless, 600
N.Y.S.2d 619 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (holding that conversion of a dormitory
into a shelter for the homeless pursuant to city financing did not violate the
“fair share” provision of the City Charter because the provision does not apply
to private facilities).
166
Further details about the proposed 1,100 megawatt power plant on the
Greenpoint/Williamasburg East River waterfront are available on the
Greenport Waterfront Association for Parks & Planning (GWAPP) website,
available at http://www.gwapp.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2002) (describing the
proposal of the power plant as a “project [that] will have 300 foot
smokestacks, spew well over a thousand tons per year of toxic emissions into
our local environment, increase the area’s already hightened [sic] asthma
levels and ruin New York City’s and New York State’s plans for parks and
residential and commercial development on the Greenpoint/Williamsburg
waterfront”); but see TransGas Energy Systems website, available at
http://www.transgasenergy.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2002) (describing the
proposal as “an environmentally responsible [project]. . . which meets all
applicable regulatory standards”).
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A. Demographics

A community’s characteristics—size, homogeneity167 and
location—play a large role in the probability of marshalling a
community-sponsored plan through the proper administrative
channels.168 As the above case studies illustrate, the smaller,
more demographically homogenous community achieved
rezoning rather easily, whereas the larger, more diverse
community had greater difficulty. One possible explanation is
that smaller, more homogenous groups may encounter fewer
obstacles in organizing, identifying leadership and agreeing on
the most beneficial use of its land because of its shared beliefs
and values.169
It is important to note, however, that the demographic
homogeneity in Vinegar Hill does not end the inquiry because
there was a sharp division between residents and businesses
throughout the planning process.170 Although demographic
167

Homogeneity can refer to many socioeconomic indicators. Although
the term may to refer to race or class, this paper points out that the term can
be misleading because it does not adequately include different segments of a
community. For example, a person can interact within the community as a
resident, a business owner, a worker, or some other combination of these
categories.
168
This phenomenon is due, generally, to the acknowledged difficulties in
collective action and organization of groups with varying interests as well as
language barriers within a community. See, e.g., supra Part IV (comparing
the barriers to collective action confronted by Vinegar Hill and Greenpoint in
the planning process).
169
See, e.g., M.P. BAUMGARTNER, THE MORAL ORDER OF A SUBURB
(1988) (noting that sociological studies in dispute resolution have considered
homogeneity a beneficial factor to consensus); see also Claus S. Fischer &
Michael Hout, Differences Among Americans in Living Standards Across the
Twentieth Century, The Survey Research Center, University of California,
Berkeley (Aug. 2000) (unpublished manuscript available at http://
216.239.37.100/search?q=cache:i6zkKTnDTlcC:ucdata.berkeley.edu/rsfcens
us/papers/livingstandards.pdf+consensus+and+homogeniety&hl=en&ie=U
TF_8).
170
Holt, supra note 85 (covering a community board meeting where
“futility and confusion” was present as rezoning arguments continued, with
the business community in opposition to any zoning changes). See also supra
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statistics portray a small, affluent group of residents, workers and
business owners whose interests may differ from residents
brought conflicting visions of the neighborhood to land use
decisions. It is exactly this tension that was not adequately
addressed throughout Vinegar Hill’s rezoning process. In
contrast, Greenpoint, a demographically diverse community,
actually emerged as a cohesive voice.171 Its cooperative process
resulted in a unanimously supported plan.172 The discrepancy
between demographics and cohesion clouds the simple conclusion
that Vinegar Hill had an easier time merely because its residents
were more demographically homogeneous and Greenpoint
encountered greater difficulty due to demographic diversity.
Ironically, the results of these two case studies could be
interpreted to discourage comprehensive community-sponsored
planning and consensus building and instead encourage planning
by small, elite groups of people without regard for their
neighbors.173 The opposite needs to be true if New York City is
Part IV.A (illustrating the lack of unanimous support for proposed rezoning
plans).
171
Although ethnically diverse, Greenpoint has a larger percentage of
residents within its workforce, thus lessening the tension between residents
and businesses seen in Vinegar Hill. See supra Part IV (setting forth the
demographics and respective workforce percentages of Greenpoint and
Vinegar Hill).
172
See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 12-13.
In general, the group [at a public forum advertised with door-to-door
copies of the plan] expressed a great deal of support for the document
with the major issue being expansion of the boundaries of Greenpoint.
This was resolved in part by including the remainder of the area in
the Greenpoint postal zip-code.
Id.; see also Schiffman Interview, supra note 153 (offering first-hand account
of unanimous support at the later meetings); Telephone Interview with Said
Ahmed, Brooklyn Office of the Department of City Planning, Nov. 8, 2000
[hereinafter Ahmed Interview] [transcript on file with author] (offering opinion
that the Greenpoint plan was strongly supported throughout the community).
173
This conclusion could be drawn from the fact that Vinegar Hill’s
relatively small group of residents effectively achieved rezoning without
arriving at a unanimously approved plan whereas Greenpoint’s plan, which
sought to incorporate input from all concerned constituents, was not adopted
by the City Planning Commission. See, generally, supra Part IV (setting forth
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to reinforce neighborhood pride, foster a communal sense of
control and increase accountability in planning policies. In short,
an equitable planning process respects all people affected by it.
As difficult as such agreements may be to reach, consensus
building should be the focal point of successful planning,
regardless of the demographic homogeneity of the residents.
Instead, it is important to ask what role demographics play in
community planning. Demographically homogenous groups may
organize more easily and thus have more time to devote to
political lobbying.174 If this is the case, the community with more
effective organization and leadership could be perceived by city
agencies as more likely to take issues to the ballot box, thus
subtly (and perhaps wrongly) convincing political representatives
that the goals of the politically savvy group reflect those of the
community as a whole. Even though there were diverse
viewpoints in Vinegar Hill, the homogeneity of the residential
community provided a unified base to pressure politicians and
create an appearance of cohesion. More organizational power
enables a group to devote time and energy to lobbying and
negotiating with city government. It may be that, although a
consensus was finally reached in Greenpoint, the decade-long
process of consensus building actually detracted from its potential
political impact.175 In this way, Greenpoint’s diverse population
may have been an obstacle to effective political power.
One way for the city to equalize communities’ abilities to
successfully rezone is to address the organizational obstacles
confronting New York’s neighborhoods. The Department of City
Planning should assist diverse communities by encouraging
the processes of each community’s rezoning).
174
It is self-evident that groups with few barriers to communication and
collective action will not be required to devote substantial resources to
ensuring inclusion of varying interests, whereas those composed of multiple
enclaves will necessarily devote greater resources to communication between
and amongst themselves, thus leaving fewer resources for garnering political
support. See supra Part IV (comparing Vinegar Hill’s efforts with
Greenpoint’s efforts to inform all concerned facets of the community).
175
See Handhart Interview, supra note 18 (suggested that the potential
impact of Greenpoint’s plan may have been hindered by the necessarily
lengthy process of consensus building).
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organization and cooperation. One possible solution is to
strengthen the 197-a process by offering leadership assistance
grants and consensus-building workshops sponsored by the city.
This would bolster the organizational power of a diverse
community like Greenpoint, freeing up time for developing the
necessary political strategies and, eventually, increasing its
chance of successfully rezoning.
Location is another factor that may influence the city’s
determination of where to expend its resources. The city could
perceive that assisting Vinegar Hill by down-zoning the area
might encourage high-end residential development and, in turn,
increase the city’s tax base.176 Although it is only served by one
subway stop, Vinegar Hill is close to Manhattan and downtown
Brooklyn, and surrounded by neighborhoods that are becoming
tourist destinations.177 Greenpoint, on the other hand, suffers
from a lack of convenient transportation to Manhattan and
Brooklyn’s commercial core, as well as a perception of isolation
because of two waterway boundaries, one highway boundary,
and a southern stretch of vacant warehouses.178
176

See Cindy Mindell-Wong, Zoning to Market, to Market: The Northeast
Quadrant, ROCHESTER CITY NEWS, May 8, 2002, available at http://www.
rochester_citynews.com/gbase/Gyrosite/Content?oid=oid%3A1203
(noting
that down-zoning, which reduces the density or intensity of use of a property
would lead to small streets of owner-occupied single family houses and higher
property values).
177
See supra Part IV.A (noting Vinegar Hill’s proximity to historical
neighborhoods and other tourist attractions).
178
See Gilbert, supra note 110, at 90. Land use and circulation may be
mismatched if development overwhelms the available transportation systems or
if the configuration and location of transportation facilities do not correspond
with the needs of that area. See EDWARD J. KAISER, DAVID R. GODSCHALK,
F. STUART CHAPIN JR., URBAN LAND USE PLANNING 230 (1995). Modern
urban planners promote public transit and walking in an effort to reduce
reliance on transportation by automobiles. See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY
MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS at 151 (noting
the importance of public transportation in “compact, walkable, multiuse
neighborhoods [which are] built around transit stops”). Convenient and
accessible transportation centers may even encourage residents to reside in a
particular area. See Robert Cervero, Growing Smart by Linking Transportation
and Urban Development, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 357 (2000) (describing a San
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Finally, the housing stock and average income of a
neighborhood may determine the city’s perception of it as a good
investment of planning resources.179 In Vinegar Hill, the rapid
response of the Department of City Planning and the area’s
development since the zoning change suggest that goals other
than the stated desire to preserve the area’s residential streets
may have played a large role in the successful rezoning.180 The
Francisco/Bay Area community where many residents “self-select to reside
near transit nodes for the very purpose of economizing on commuting”).
Considerations in community planning, however, must also be given to other
forms of transit that promote efficient circulation. See KAISER, supra, at 376
(describing a “multimodal” public transportation system that also incorporates
taxicabs, bicycles, pedestrians, carpools and parking); see also Oliver A.
Pollard III, Smart Growth and Sustainable Transportation: Can We Get There
From Here?, 29 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1529 (2002) (asserting that community
growth will be difficult to achieve without more sustainable transportation
approaches and, likewise, significant transportation improvements will be
difficult to achieve without more sensible development practices).
179
Scholars argue that municipality residents that do not live in
exclusively residential districts, but in mixed-use districts are usually less
affluent apartment dwellers whereas municipality residents in exclusively
residential districts are usually owners of detached dwellings. See, e.g., Joel
Kosman, Toward an Inclusionary Jurisprudence: A Reconceptualization of
Zoning, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 59 (1993). Hence, the “desirable citizen” in
purely residential districts is one that can afford his own home, and those who
cannot are forced to live in mixed use districts. Id. at 84. Others argue that
land use development in the absence of zoning is usually orderly and many
uses will locate in the same place whether zoning is in effect or not. See, e.g.,
Bernard H. Siegan, Non-zoning is the Best Zoning, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 127
(1994). Siegan argues that, “[f]or those who are economically better off,
zoning is a luxury. In its absence, reasonable protection of their urban
environment can be accomplished by imposing and enforcing restrictive
covenants and a limited number of laws.” Id. at 139. Siegan delivered a series
of speeches urging voters to reject zoning and a proposed zoning ordinance in
Houston, Texas and suggested that instead of forced zoning, the “city should
make every effort to preserve and enforce deed restrictions.” Id.
180
See Brozan, supra note 105 (discussing real estate plans by developer
David C. Walentas, who has owned large chunks of land in the area and has
worked to revitalize the community); See generally, Patrick J. Skelley, Public
Participation in Brownfield Remediation Systems: Putting the Community Back
on the (Zoning) Map, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 389, 406-12 (1997). Skelly
notes that “governmental bodies are presumably equipped to determine not
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city was likely interested in encouraging high-end residential
development and the retail-entertainment facilities that usually
follow such development in this section of Brooklyn.181 This sort
of development benefits both the city and the borough by drawing
tourism and upper-middle class residents to the area.
Neighborhood revitalization is attractive to Vinegar Hill residents
as well because of the services that follow such as more
transportation, stores, theaters and restaurants.182 Because
organized residents of Vinegar Hill are predominantly
homeowners, the increase in services could outweigh fears of
increased rents.183 In real estate lingo, location is everything—
only whether a property owner’s use of land is appropriate in reference to
neighboring uses, but whether such a use accords with regional needs and
concerns, given a zoning entity’s familiarity with master plans and other
comprehensive planning techniques.” Id. at 411. According to Skelley, zoning
can also “be carried out to best promote the public health, safety, and general
welfare.” Id.
181
See Bowles, supra note 64, at 23. Bowles explains that the city’s
housing crisis brought many young professionals to the borough of Brooklyn,
and these newer residents “favor[ed] new housing, shops and amenities.” Id.
Furthermore, residents living in or near areas that had been zoned for heavy
manufacturing “have been aggressively pushing city officials to rezone large
swaths of those areas for residential use, usually with local political support.
[Additionally,] [m]ounting political pressure from votes . . . is likely to keep
the political momentum going.” Id.
182
See Brozan, supra note 105 (quoting local developer David Walentas
as saying of the area, “[a] year ago, there was no retail in the neighborhood.
Now we have a Korean market, a chocolatier, antiques shops, art galleries.”).
183
Homeowners with steady incomes will only be removed from their
homes through eminent domain, which requires just compensation, or if
property values increase so much as to make property taxes unaffordable to
them. In contrast, renters can be forced to move due to rent increases. See
David B. Fein, Historic Districts: Preserving City Neighborhoods for the
Privileged, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 64 (1985). Fein notes that renters are more
vulnerable residents because “[l]andlords may evict their tenants directly or
may sell their buildings to people who will convert them to single-family use.
Additionally, rehabilitation may lead to steep rent increases, which in turn
may force low-income tenants to leave their homes.” Id. at 85. He further
states that “[l]ow-income homeowners . . . may also be displaced by
gentrification.” Id.; Ray Telles, Comment: Forgotten Voices: Gentrification
and Its Victims, 3 SCHOLAR 115 (2000). Telles notes that “when the upper-
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Vinegar Hill was in the right place at the right time, and in
economic terms, its plan was efficient.
B. Access to Resources
While the city may look to a community’s income as a factor
related to development incentives and overall economic promise,
a community’s financial status is also a tool to gain access to
resources including time, money and technical assistance. This is
essential to a successful planning process.184 Without adequate
resources, there is little chance that public participation will
affect decisions in a meaningful way. As these two studies reveal,
the fact that Vinegar Hill had an easier time rezoning than
Greenpoint was due in part to the city’s direct assistance.
The City Planning Commission donated time and energy to
Vinegar Hill by conducting a zoning study of the area and
income inhabitants, instead of building new homes, relocate to the older
neighborhoods previously lived in by lower income groups . . . new money is
spent in renovation and repair.” Id. at 131. Once large scale renovation
begins, with “more and more money being pumped into these older
neighborhoods, property taxes increase. With increased property taxes,
landowners find justification for increased rents. Accordingly, the few
remaining low-income residents are displaced by skyrocketing rents, which are
paid by incoming upper-income tenants.” Id.
184
See MAS, STATE OF 197-A PLANNING, supra note 26, at 9 (noting the
amounts of funding and time required to develop a successful community
zoning plan). Access to financial resources is required for towns undertaking
any significant new construction. See NEW TOWNS SYMPOSIUM in JAMES A,
LYONS JR. ET AL., NEW TOWNS AND PLANNED COMMUNITIES 243 (1971)
(noting that constructing a town within the span of a few years raises financial
problems not ordinarily faced by other towns which develop more slowly);
JANE JACOBS, THE ECONOMY OF CITIES 122 (1969) (asserting that the
problems of growing cities are only solved by new goods and services that
increase economic abundance). Because zoning and environmental clean-up
also involves scientific research and technological prowess, access to resources
is also necessary to facilitate community understanding of the process and
available information. See generally Spyke, supra note 3, at 293-95 (noting
that environmental clean-up and rezoning “necessitates the compilation of
enormous amounts of data” and that “participation programs demand large
amounts of time, are difficult to manage”).
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proposing the zoning changes itself at the community’s request.185
This assistance eliminated many potential pitfalls for the Vinegar
Hill community, including financial and technical hindrances. In
contrast, Greenpoint did its planning work without assistance
from the city.186 Financial constraints played a role in working
through the different viewpoints because everyone participated on
a volunteer basis and, for most people, this meant after a long
day of work.187 Such constraints slowed Greenpoint’s progress
and detracted from the amount of time available for political
lobbying and dialogue.188 Although it is admittedly unfeasible for
the Department of City Planning to conduct zoning studies of
every area requested, the city could provide grants or allow
communities to apply for extra financial assistance.189 Financial
aid could remedy the disparity between communities with access
185

See generally CITY PLANNING COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note
73 (indicating that city agencies conducted a zoning study and submitted
proposals on behalf of the Vinegar Hill community); see also Bowles, supra
note 64, at 21, 24 (surmising that Council member Ken Fisher’s help in
gaining historic landmark status for the Vinegar Hill district was instrumental
in rezoning the district as residential).
186
See generally Schiffman Interview, supra note 153 (noting the lack of
municipal contribution to Greenpoint’s planning process); Handhart Interview,
supra note 18 (noting that Greenpoint residents and volunteer workers staffed
many of the committees). Some commentators suggest that the city does not do
enough to help industrial and commercial land users as well. See generally
Jonathan Bowles, The Big Squeeze, CENTER FOR AN URBAN FUTURE,
available at http://www.nycfuture.org/content/reports/report_view.cfm?
repkey=54&area=realpol (May 1, 1999) (noting that a problem faced by
industrial and commercial landusers is “the failure to develop the large supply
of unused city-owned land” and that although the city possesses a substantial
amount of land, “little has been done to encourage its redevelopment for
industrial use.”). Id.
187
See Handhart Interview, supra note 18. According to Handhart, even
though all public participation is voluntary, there is an advantage to having
one or two people take on full-time coordination and organization rather than
requiring people to devote time to the process after they may have already
completed a day of work at a full-time job. Id.
188
See generally id.
189
Funding could be made available to individual communities in the
event that the city is unable to provide staffing for the actual work.
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to funding and communities without such resources. This would
also remove some of the city’s discretion as to which
communities were economically desirable for rezoning, and
lessen the impact of economic considerations and disparity in
land use decision making.
Vinegar Hill also benefited from the city’s technical
assistance.190 The fact that the Department of City Planning used
its expertise to study the area and propose zoning changes
relieved residents from struggling with the complications of
environmental impact studies, statistical analysis and complex
legal issues.191 Greenpoint, on the other hand, had to locate its
own assistance. Over the years, local universities offered aid for
Greenpoint’s planning efforts but, because of the temporary
nature of student research projects, this assistance was often
incremental.192 Lack of technical assistance exacerbated
190

See NYC ZONING STUDY, VINEGAR HILL, supra note 56 (noting that
the city conducted zoning studies of the area, and such work was not
undertaken at the community’s expense). See also Angotti, supra note 25
(discussing the difficulty of obtaining approval of a district’s 197-a plan
without technical assistance from the City Planning Commission); Bowles,
supra note 64 (suggesting that Vinegar Hill’s plan was approved over
proposals from other districts because “they had the politicians’ ear”); Bill
Farrell, Vinegar Hill Eyes Future Decisions on Zoning, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 24, 1997, at 1997 WL 16053356 (describing certain rezoning proposals
by the City Planning Commission).
191
See generally NYC ZONING STUDY, VINEGAR HILL, supra note 56
(including background information about existing land use and zoning of the
area, recommendations for rezoning parts of Vinegar Hill, and statistical data
and charts analyzing and highlighting the findings of the study). See also
Angotti, supra note 25 (noting that developing a 197-a proposal is often
prohibitively time-consuming and costly to the district if it does not receive at
least some technical assistance from the City Planning Commission); Bowles,
supra note 64 (suggesting that a community must gain the support of the City
Planning Commission before developing a proposal because the assistance of
the City Planning Commission increases the probability of a plan being
approved).
192
See supra note 147 (noting the study completed by the Pratt Institute,
which included an historical analysis, industrial and demographic profiles, a
pilot real estate study, a telephone survey, an examination of zoning
regulations and the impact of potential land use scenarios as well as a
description of government programs affecting the neighborhood but pointing

WIDMANDMACRO1-20.DOC

4/1/03 2:56 PM

COMMUNITY PLANNING

183

organizational struggles, and the lack of consensus among
Greenpoint residents frequently frustrated those trying to help in
the early stages of the planning process.193 Greenpoint’s current
197-a plan was drafted with the support and expertise of the Pratt
Institute’s Center for Community and Economic Development,
which provided the organizational and consensus building
techniques necessary to synthesize competing visions.194
The burdens of community planning are great, and the
Department of City Planning has acknowledged the importance of
such assistance in the past.195 Revisions to the City Charter in
1989 attempted to lessen this burden by removing environmental
impact assessments from the 197-a process and allowing
community boards the freedom to hire planning consultants to
assist with 197-a plans.196 Community Board requests to the
out that the plan did not achieve tangible results or effective re-zoning). See
also supra note 150 (noting that Columbia University and the Pratt Institute
have both offered volunteer services to communities seeking to re-zone or
establish proposed 197-a plans).
193
See Handhart Interview, supra note 18 (noting that, despite generous
offers of assistance from institutes and community-based organizations,
difficulties in communication and coalition building ultimately frustrated
efforts and resulted in abandonment of start-up projects).
194
See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 8
(“Greenpoint’s 197-a plan was refined and completed over the past year with
the technical assistance and resources from the Pratt Institute Center for
Community and Environmental Development.”); see also Bowles, supra note
64, at 25 (citing Ron Shiffman, director of the Pratt Intitute Center for
Community and Environmental Development, as the author of the Greenpoint
197-a plan).
195
See MAS, STATE OF 197-A PLANNING, supra note 26, at 9
(acknowledging the difficulties of coalescing multiple viewpoints and
formulating community rezoning plans and noting the importance of
government assistance in doing so).
196
See supra note 30; see generally supra Part III (discussing
amendments to the City Charter and the role of the ULURP in undertaking
environmental review studies). Some commentators have suggested, however,
that this effort has been ineffective or even detrimental to community planning
and municipal intervention in the process of environmental review and
compliance. See, e.g., Alan Breznick, Building in N.Y. Getting Even Harder,
CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Jan. 1, 1990, at 11 (noting that provisions in the City
Charter attempt to impose some limits on environmental reviews, but arguing

WIDMANDMACRO1-20.DOC

184

4/1/03 2:56 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Department of City Planning for financial assistance to pay
consultants, however, have been ignored.197
Comparing the case studies, Vinegar Hill received substantial
assistance from the Department of City Planning while
Greenpoint received little. Without equal access to assistance,
communities like Greenpoint will remain at a disadvantage when
it comes to community-sponsored planning. Equitable
sponsorship of communities is necessary to foster communitybased 197-a plans from all communities, not just those that are
effectively organized and politically savvy.
C. Each Community’s Stated Goals
The success of the Vinegar Hill plan may also have stemmed
from the limited goals of its efforts. The Vinegar Hill study
encompassed a few blocks that the plan proposed to preserve as a
residential area.198 The destruction of the 135-year-old Roman
that complex state and federal environmental mandates beyond the city’s
control will hinder the charter’s effectiveness); Alan Breznick, Effort to Speed
Environmental Reviews, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., May 27, 1991, at 55 (citing real
estate officials’ concerns that the role and authority of the Office of
Environmental Coordination, established under the 1989 City Charter
revisions, has not been defined clearly enough to allow the office to
accomplish its goal of hastening environmental review); Thomas J. Lueck,
Assessing New York’s Charter Change, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1989, at § 10, 1
(quoting Kent Barwick, executive director of the Municipal Art Society, as
stating the revisions to the City Charter “won’t make things worse” but noting
that “[t]hey simply fail to make things better.”).
197
See MAS, STATE OF 197-A PLANNING, supra note 26, at 10 (noting that
requests to city agencies for financing and funding have gone unanswered).
Community Boards continue to request funding from city agencies to review
existing utilization and zoning requirements. See COMMUNITY DISTRICT
NEEDS, supra note 46, at 21-22 (indicating that Community Board 1
“support[s] the use of city funds to develop 197-a plans and urge[s] the City to
implement the Charter mandate of providing additional funding for each
Community Board to have a planner on staff.”).
198
See CITY PLANNING COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 1
(noting that “Vinegar Hill is an approximately eight block area” and that “the
Department of City Planning is undertaking this zoning study to determine if it
is appropriate to rezone areas within Vinegar Hill to a residential district”).
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Catholic Church in the early 1990s by a waste treatment company
was the main catalyst behind neighborhood organizing.199 That
visible change made the residents fear that “the big and profitable
business of garbage [would] rapidly destroy a small but beautiful
area with great history.”200 The Department of City Planning
199

Waldman, supra note 63, at CY8 (explaining that the destruction of
this church created fear among residents that the owners of the property would
begin treating waste on the site, which was directly across the street from a
row of historic houses); Choices Cover, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 8, 1998, at 64
(noting that “with the destruction of the church, Vinegar Hill dug its heels into
the ground and refused to budge”).
A strong reaction by one homogenous group to a particular action or
siting decision, in this case the residents’ response to a waste treatment
company moving in, is reminiscent of behavior known by the acronym
NIMBY — “not in my backyard.” NIMBYism is a response seen when
communities rally against a possible change in land use that is viewed as
detrimental in some way. See generally Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and
Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities: A Comprehensive
Approach to a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1047 (1994). Gerrand
argues that “[a]lthough facility opposition is often trivialized with acronyms
like NIMBY (“Not In My Backyard”), LULU (“Locally Undesirable Land
Use”), or BANANA (“Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anything”),
even new, ‘state-of-the-art’ facilities pose real environmental hazards.” Id. at
1054. NIMBYism is often invoked to prevent sitings of LULUs in particular
neighborhoods. Id.
The race and class ramifications of NIMBY actions are noted in the
response acronym, PIBBY—“put in black’s backyard.” For an enlightening
review of these and other environmental concerns in contemporary society, see
ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1990). The siting of an undesirable facility in a
minority neighborhood is seen as an example of inequity in environmental
protection. See also Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap
Between Environmental Laws and “Justice,” 47 AM. U.L. REV. 221 (1997)
(noting that environmental laws may reveal that a site was selected despite its
failure to meet the necessary qualifications and citing that the role of
environmental justice in pursuing political justice ought to be explored in
connection with environmental justice disputes involving the siting of
undesirable land uses). The appearance of NIMBYism in Vinegar Hill’s
process warrants concern because the community is not being represented in
its entirety.
200
See Lentz, supra note 90, at 16 (detailing the nature of the dispute
between local residents and business owners).
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found those fears legitimate, and Commissioner Joseph Rose
stated that the Department would “not do anything that has an
adverse impact on the economic activity in the area, [b]ut [ ]
[would] take action to prevent the area from being turned into a
waste transfer focus.”201
Greenpoint’s plan was also “a response to a series of illconsidered public and private actions. From the late fifties to
today public policies have led Greenpoint’s eastern sector to
become a ‘dumping ground’ for burdensome facilities.”202
However, Greenpoint’s plan differs from Vinegar Hill’s in many
respects. Greenpoint’s plan encompasses a much larger area.203
and calls for a re-evaluation of environmental standards, planned
open space and more pedestrian-friendly streets.204 In contrast to
201

Id.
See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 3. Cf., Michael
Burger, NYC Issues 2001: The Environment, GOTHAM GAZETTE, at http://
www.gothamgazette.com/searchlight2001 (stating that New York City’s shortterm solutions for its environmental problems “saddles” low income
neighborhoods like Greenpoint with power plants and waste transfer stations
and as a result these neighborhoods shoulder the city’s pollution burdens);
JANE SWEENEY ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS PROGRAM, The MegaCities Project Publication MCP-018G, (1998) (asserting that Greenpoint
suffers from severe environmental degradation as a result of its high
concentration of industrial activity and the community’s position at the center
of New York City’s waste disposal network).
The community is host to: a large, antiquated incinerator burning
garbage (including medical waste) from the entire city; numerous
garbage “transfer stations,” often resulting in illegal dumping; and a
massive waste water treatment plant, the Newtown Creek Water
Pollution Control Plant (WPCP), which handles about 20% of the
city’s waste water and has not been in compliance with state
environmental regulations for years.
Id.
203
As noted, Vinegar Hill’s plan encompassed merely eight blocks. See
NYC ZONING STUDY, VINEGAR HILL, supra note 56, at 1. Greenpoint’s plan,
however, initially included fourteen census tracts and was later expanded to
include an additional seventeen block area. See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A,
supra note 109, at 8.
204
See id. at 38 (recommending economic, social, environmental, as well
as quality of life improvements for Greenpoint). Recommendations included
202
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Vinegar Hill’s call for down-zoning, Greenpoint seeks to remain
a viable mixed-use district with a diverse residential population
and cleaner industry.205 Greenpoint’s 197-a plan states that “[i]t is
a plan to address the future of this community, to build upon its
strengths, and to eliminate the impediments to the growth of a
healthy and viable community.”206 The larger scope and the
emphasis on mixed-use districts should be lauded as an
innovative approach toward accepting and promoting responsible
industry.207 Instead, the scope of Greenpoint’s plan may have
initiating a charter calling “for Fair Share Siting Criteria to be used as a
guideline in locating city facilities” so as to prevent the community from
expanding burdensome facilities, and developing “an aggressive and sustained
greening program for Greenpoint.” Id.
205
Id. at 20-22. The Greenpoint 197-a plan notes that planning involves
providing job training for new young immigrants and developing community
facilities such as schools and other educational institutions that respond to
Greenpoint’s diverse population. Id. at 56, 57. It also includes building a new
library that incorporates an expanded collection of books in foreign languages
to meet the needs of Greenpoint’s diverse ethnic groups. Id. at 57. The plan
also involves creating a centrally located space for local community groups,
which would allow and further encourage the development of a cooperative
spirit among diverse groups. Id. This space would also accommodate a harvest
festival every summer to celebrate Greenpoint’s diversity. Id.
206
Id. at 3.
207
See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 20-22. The
Greenpoint plan proposes mixed-use zones that would limit industrial
expansion to businesses that enter into good neighbor agreements and
demonstrate that they can meet strict environmental performance standards.
Id. at 32. Performance-based standards are ceilings on the amount of pollution
a given manufacturer can emit and permit manufacturers to choose how to
meet the applicable standard. For a thorough explanation of this and other
regulatory controls, see generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market?
Conflict between Tradable Pollution Allowances and the “Polluter Pays”
Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465 (2000). Nash proposes that
“[m]odern environmental regulations grow out of the understanding that, in
their absence, manufacturers will externalize their costs and push them down
the line to government or society-at-large.” Id. at 480. He states that
“[r]egulations seek to avoid this undesirable result by forcing prospective
polluters to take measures, at their cost, to reduce their pollution emissions to
an acceptable level and pay for damages caused by residual pollution
emissions that occur despite these measures.” Id.
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stalled its progress. According to the Brooklyn Office of City
Planning, the plan’s breadth most likely resulted in the City
Planning Commission striking down many parts of the plan.208
Others suggest however, that plain economic efficiency prevented
implementation of the plan.209
Arguably, the city has little economic incentive to approve a
plan like Greenpoint’s. A pure cost-benefit analysis might reveal
that such a plan is economically inefficient due to the
administrative costs of restructuring the environmental standards,
the costs of monitoring compliance, and the economic burden
placed on industries’ production levels as a result of stricter
standards.210 Others, however, might suggest that the plan is
efficient in the long-term because it reduces environmental harm
and may bring new residents and businesses to the area; thus the
up-front costs of restructuring and monitoring are balanced by the

208

See Ahmed Interview, supra note 172 (suggesting that the scope of
Greenpoint’s proposed re-zoning areas and overall sweep of the plan had
deleterious effects on the agency’s acceptance of the provision as a whole); see
also Bowles, supra note 64, at 24. According to those that have worked on the
plan, the Office of City Planning has not embraced many of the community’s
recommendations. Id. at 25. Officials have informed the community that the
changes they are calling for are not in accordance with city regulations. Id.
Planners have theorized “that the Commission is motivated by a desire to
reserve potential sites for essential services that can’t be located outside the
city.” Id.
209
See Bowles, supra note 64, at 24. According to Bowles, some
observers attributed the plan’s failure to “the agency’s coziness with real estate
industry, which they say results in a bias toward zoning land for the most
profitable uses possible.” Id.
210
See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The
Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787,
793 (1992) (noting that “environmental protection requires governmental
expenditures, the source of which varies from general personal and corporate
income taxes to special environmental taxes. These expenditures necessarily
decrease public monies available for other social welfare programs”); see also
Wallace E. Oates, Symposium, Innovations in Environmental Policy: From
Research to Policy: The Case of Environmental Economics, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 135, 149 (2000) (noting the difficulty of placing monetary values on
benefits, such as improved health and extended longevity, that result from
reduced air pollution).
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future benefit.211 Participation theory advocates would support
Greenpoint’s plan because of the value of the consensus-building
process itself in empowering communities and encouraging
leadership.212 Thus, whether decision makers should be guided by
an economic model or public participation model becomes an
important question.
D. Conclusions Drawn from the Case Studies
Community demographics; access to technical, financial and
political resources; and the development and economic needs of
the city are all at play when a community seeks to organize and
influence land use decisions. The case studies present two
narratives that illustrate the disparate effects of the current
decision-making scheme. While it is fair to allow the city a
degree of input into community-sponsored plans to ensure that
citywide agendas are not undermined, something more than
economic analysis must guide the decisions of the Department of
City Planning. Without an emphasis on public participation and
inclusive decision making, there are no mechanisms in place to
ensure that the Department of City Planning is accountable to
disadvantaged communities whose interests may differ from those
211

Cf. NICK HANLEY ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS IN THEORY
PRACTICE 29 (1997). Other overlapping rationales that explain
environmental problems include the Coase theorem (arguing that the failure or
inability of institutions to establish well-defined property rights results in lack
of economic incentives to prevent environmental degradation); “tragedy of the
common” (arguing that when it is impossible or costly to deny access to an
environmental resource, the preservation/conservation of the common
resource is likely to be ignored); and Samuelson’s public goods theory
(arguing that since everyone benefits from the services provided by a pure
public good such as clean air, it is easy for a “free rider” to enjoy the benefits
without paying for them). See generally id. at 22-57.
212
See, e.g., Spyke, supra note 3, at 271. Spyke notes that “although it
may be true that the primary goal of some individuals is to convince
decisionmakers to accept their solution to a problem, a secondary goal is to
create feelings of self-confidence and shared control of government.” Id.
Thus, the participation in the process is itself empowering and affords “a sense
of control over one’s life and a feeling of political efficacy can also lead
individuals to perceive the decisionmaking process as more democratic.” Id.

AND
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of the city at large.
VI. TOWARD A NEW SOLUTION
The first step towards infusing land use decision-making
processes with meaningful and inclusive public participation is to
favor comprehensive plans, like the two examined above, over ad
hoc zoning.213 The idea of comprehensive planning has long been
considered integral to the idea of zoning and, within the province
of state and local governments, as responsive to community
needs.214 The Department of Commerce’s Standard Zoning
Enabling Act (“SZEA”) of 1922 required that land use decisions
be made “in accordance with a general plan.”215 Soon after the
213

See NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, 197-A PLAN
TECHNICAL GUIDE 7 (1997). The Technical Guide suggests that the 197-a
process will work and be effective over time if the community offers its
consensus on the principles that should guide future land use. Id. Those
principles will in turn serve as a guide for the agencies and individuals in
decision-making positions about the neighborhood. Id. Furthermore, the
strong community support will convince those decision makers that the actions
proposed by the community are necessary. Id. at 8.
214
See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Euclid
involved a challenge to the comprehensive plan for the Village of Euclid, Ohio
that regulated and restricted the location, size, and height of the companies,
industries, apartment buildings, two-family houses, and single-family houses.
Id. at 380. An owner of unimproved land within the corporate limits of the
village, sought the relief upon the ground that, because of the building
restrictions imposed, the ordinance operated to reduce the normal value of his
property, and to deprive him of liberty and property without due process of
law. Id. at 383-84. The Court noted that:
[i]f the municipal council deemed any of the reasons which have been
suggested, or any other substantial reason, a sufficient reason for
adopting the ordinance in question, it is not the province of the courts
to take issue with the council. We have nothing to do with the
question of the wisdom or good policy of municipal ordinances. If
they are not satisfying to a majority of the citizens, their recourse is
to the ballot—not the courts.
Id. at 393, quoting State v. City of New Orleans, 97 So. 440 (La. 1923).
215
See Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (U.S. Dep’t of Commerce
rev. ed. 1926), reprinted in Model Land Dev. Code app. A at 210-21 (Ten.
Draft No. 1, 1968); see also Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing:
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SZEA was enacted, general plans were deemed inflexible and
disruptive to growth.216 “Wait and see” zoning developed as a
reaction to the limits of comprehensive plans.217 Courts have not
consistently expressed a preference for one form over the other.
Indeed, at least one state court went so far as to practically
endorse “wait and see zoning,”218 while other courts have tended
to treat individual rezoning requests with less deference, instead
upholding the primacy of the general plan.219 Nevertheless, a lack
Piecemeal Land Controls as Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV.
839 (1983) [hereinafter Rose, Planning and Dealing]. Rose notes that:
[t]he planning idea is not new, although it has only recently been
taken seriously. In fact, the preference for ‘structured’ land decisions
harks back to one of the oldest methods of assuring both fairness and
due consideration in local land use regulation. The Department of
Commerce’s Standard Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA), first published
in 1922 and adopted by most states over the next few years, required
that local land use controls be “in accordance with” a general plan.
Id. at 848. A general plan developed by each community considers its own
locally defined goals and is then utilized to direct and guide future decisions
affecting land use within that community. Id.
216
See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Freedom—A Suggested Analysis, 68 HARV.
L. REV. 1305 (1955). Fuller offers narratives that explain the inflexibility
inherent in the government planning of economic activity. Id. at 1325. One
example is the planning of a road. Id. He claims that, while planning the road
in advance would be beneficial in some respects, such as the the ability to
bring in experts to devise the best route, it would also have drawbacks because
the planning would not take into account future utilization of the road. Id.
217
See, e.g., Edward J. Sullivan & Thomas G. Pelham, The Evolving
Role of the Comprehensive Plan, 29 URB. LAW 363 (1997) (noting that ad hoc
zoning, “affect[s] the land of the few without proper regard to the needs or
design of the community as a whole”). The essential purpose of the
requirement that rezoning be in accordance with a comprehensive plan is to
guard against ad hoc zoning, or “wait and see” zoning, which allows for small
parcels to be rezoned one at a time. Id.
218
See Snyder v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 595 So.2d 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (finding individual rezoning requests, essentially ad hoc piecemeal
re-zoning, legislative in nature and thus subject to deferential review by the
courts).
219
See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993)
(quashing a lower court finding that ad hoc zoning request should be given
deferential review by courts). The problem with deferring to ad hoc zoning
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of a comprehensive plan remains the norm.220 Such plans,
especially when they result from an inclusive process, do more to
foster public participation and simultaneously decrease the
potential for corruption because of the diversity of opinions
shaping the decisions.221 Some argue that ad hoc zoning, in
constrast, is vulnerable to domination by factions.222
Ad hoc zoning does include a degree of public participation,
but this participation is more likely to be at the decision-making
stage when developers are attempting to obtain variances or
special use permits.223 At this point, public opposition to the
lies in the difficulty in determining what qualifies as an individual rezoning
request as opposed to a comprehensive zoning plan. Id. at 471. The Florida
Supreme Court overruled the deferential standard as it applied to individual
rezoning, noting that “comprehensive rezonings affecting a large portion of
the public are legislative in nature.” Id. at 474. The court emphasized that
zoning decisions should be consistent with a legislatively sponsored
comprehensive plan. Id.
220
See Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 215, at 841 (noting that
the variance, conditional use permit, and small-scale rezoning ordinance are
“the everyday fare of local land regulations”); see also Daniel R. Mandelker,
American Planning Association Growing Smart Project: The Growing Smart
Legislative Guidebook, SH018 ALI-ABA 757 (2002) (describing the “wait and
see” approach to zoning and stating “the process for obtaining [a] zone change
and the discretionary permits is often a sequential, rather than a concurrent,
one, and considerable negotiation and uncertainty [especially with neighboring
property owners] occur at each step of the process”).
221
See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE
AMERICAN CITY: DOUGLAS COMMISSION REPORT, H.R. DOC. NO. 91-34, at
220 (1968) [hereinafter DOUGLAS]; see also Rose, Ancient Constitution, supra
note 9, at 96-97 (citing the virtues of “possibilities for constituent contact and
civic participation” in local government as “structural restraints” on political
power); Fred P. Bosselman, The Impact of the Douglas Commission of Local
Planning, C85 ALI-ABA 433, 471 (1993) (describing the “wait and see”
technique as a promising device toward achieving harmony without monotony
in small-scale relationships between blocks and neighborhoods).
222
See, e.g., DOUGLAS, supra note 221, at 206-08 (discussing why the
wait-and-see approach has replaced more self-executing regulations); see
Rose, Ancient Constitution, supra note 9, at 855 (discussing the propensity for
faction domination when a legislative body is drawn from too small or
homogenous constituency).
223
See Eric Bergman & Arthur Jacobson, Environmental Performance
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rezoning is not economically efficient because it can result in
delay or abandonment of a project in which developers and
businesses are already invested.224 The form of inclusive
participation that results in building consensus and empowering
citizens directs attention to the process itself. Although Vinegar
Hill’s process may seem like an example of successful public
participation, it qualifies only insofar as residents are
concerned.225 To be sure, public hearings are a form of public
participation. It is troublesome, however, that the public hearings
did not generate meaningful dialogue or affect the decisionmaking process, because the strong opposition by area business
was virtually ignored.226 Vinegar Hill’s process, though
Review: Self Regulation in Environmental Law, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 465
(1994). In the course of an “environmental review process,” the lead agency
initially determines whether the specific project sought to be pursued will have
a substantial environmental impact. Id. The findings are presented to the
agency and rigorous debate ensues among the related entities. Id. This phase
of the process is not open to the public. Id. at 489. However, agency rules
often require public participation with zoning variances and condemnation, in
the course of which relevant environmental factors are often raised. Id. For
further analysis of regulation of the zoning process, see Michel Gelobter, The
Meaning of Urban Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 841, 845
(1994) (discussing how both urban and rural areas have rules to regulate the
balancing of exchange and use values of land, but cities have many more rules
that factor into weighing these values, including public participation in
variances to them).
224
See JOHN VRANICAR, STREAMLINING LAND USE REGULATION: A
GUIDEBOOK FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 4-7 (1980) (considering problems with
zoning systems, including that of “wait and see zoning,” zoning used to
discourage homebuilding, delays and complicated rules for applications, and
the turning of land use into a “lawyers’ game”).
225
See supra Part IV.A (indicating that Vinegar Hill’s zoning process was
largely a product of residential participation, at the exclusion and expense of
commercial and industrial interests).
226
See Lentz, supra note 90. Lentz notes that the plan to rezone Vinegar
Hill has been met with displeasure by many of the industrial inhabitants of the
area, because it overtly favors local homeowners. Id. The proposed zoning
plan was initiated to protect residents from further industrial and commercial
expansion. Id. The city’s plan seeks to prevent more waste treatment stations
from occupying Vinegar Hill to ameliorate some of the concerns of its
residents. Id. Conversely, local commercial entities fear this plan will hinder
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successful in some respects, is reminiscent of a more
individualized rezoning request and not a model for consensus
building.
In contrast, consensus building was one of the main visions of
Greenpoint’s plan:
The Greenpoint 197-a Plan identifies planning and
development strategies that respond to the needs of the
Greenpoint community and build on its assets. The
Greenpoint Waterfront Committee, working together with
local community groups and organizations, prepared the
plan which reflects a consensus of different neighborhood
interests. Through public forums, workshops, discussions,
petitions, and local newspapers, collaboration between
community-based
groups,
merchants,
residents,
manufacturers, new and old immigrants, and the young
and the old began to revitalize the community by means of
this local planning process.227
Evidence of an inclusive process is found in the unanimous
consent for the plan from all groups: industry, businesses,
homeowners and renters.228 The ultimate unanimity does not
indicate that the process was easy. Rather, it highlights the
important work that is done when all affected groups come
together to determine the optimal usage for land in their
neighborhoods.229 Such consensus building is much more likely to
future business growth and eventually force them out of the community. Id.
Currently, Vinegar Hill is zoned for manufacturing, with a majority of the
homes listed as nonconforming uses. Id. The proposal would effectively
rezone the area to make it predominately residential. Id.
227
PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 6.
228
See supra note 172 (quoting the plan’s assertions, as well as first-hand
accounts, of unanimity); see also Dennis Hamill, Writer’s a Fighter for
Greenpoint, DAILY NEWS, Mar. 26, 2000, at 8 (detailing the activism of
members of the Greenpoint community in forming the Greenpoint 197-a
Waterfront Committee and suggesting reasons why these groups approved the
Greenpoint Plan).
229
See, e.g., Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75
N.C. L. REV. 75 (1996). A more inclusive process for land use decisions is
recommended if a community’s process for comparing risks and benefits fails
to capture all of the considerations believed to be relevant to its residents. Id.
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occur when the entire neighborhood is at issue rather than
through piecemeal “wait and see” zoning.230
The result of Greenpoint’s consensus building was an
innovation proposal for mixed-use zoning which holds industry to
performance-based standards.231 The plan rejects the notion that
industry is categorically inconsistent with environmental health.232
Instead of exacerbating the divide between jobs and the
environment or residents and industry, the Greenpoint
community took responsibility for its industrial sites, recognized
the large portion of residents whose livelihood depended on that
industry, and incorporated industry’s needs into the plan.233
The mixed-use zones proposed by the Greenpoint plan are to
be preceded by performance-based standards that are meant to
“guarantee that any enterprise that locates or functions in
Greenpoint meets the highest environmental standards and
at 104.
230

See Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 215, at 841-42 (noting
that piecemeal changes appear to have little effect outside the individual
developer and the property’s neighbors, but that the effects have a significant
“cumulative effect”). See also Spyke, supra note 3, at 296 (noting that
“piecemeal enactment of federal laws has left the nation with a patchwork
quilt of legislation.”).
231
See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109 (discussing how
collaboration between community-based groups, merchants, residents,
manufacturers, and people of different demographic groups, relying upon
public forums, workshops, petitions, and advertisements in local newspapers,
resulted in a decade of planning and developing strategies to respond to the
needs of the entire Greenpoint community through communication,
negotiation, and eventually consensus).
232
Id. at 32. The plan promotes industrial development while
simultaneously initiating conservationist and other environmental programs
that work in conjunction with the new development. Id. The plan advocates
“sustainable development,” defined as development that “maintains or
enhances economic opportunity and community well-being while protecting
and restoring the resource base and the life support systems upon which people
and economies depend.” Id. This sustainability plan includes “integration of
conservation and development efforts” and “maintaining ecological integrity.”
Id. One example proposed in the plan is the promotion of tree planting, park
creation, and the regreening of industrial zones. Id.
233
Id. at 35.
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contributes to improving the area’s quality of life.”234 The
community would use tools like mandatory demonstration of
ability to comply and good-neighbor agreements to implement
such standards.235 Under this model, mixed-use zones become
opportunities for both business and residential expansion, while
at the same time bringing conversions and nonconforming uses
into conformance.
Greenpoint’s process provides an excellent example of an
innovative plan that reflects the needs of all members of the
community. Reliance on mixed-use districts breathes new life
into abandoned manufacturing zones along Brooklyn’s
waterfront, and simultaneously retains the businesses and
industry that are vital to many of the working class residents. The
plan also encourages future compromise between residents and
industry by performance standards developed in conjunction with
good neighbor agreements.236 Instead of forcing out less desirable
industry, it creates innovative monitoring stations in conjunction
with the New York City Department of Environmental
Protection.237 The monitoring stations would educate the public
about environmental effects of the industry while measuring air
and water quality to ensure compliance with existing
regulations.238 Additionally, the plan provides for commercial
234

Id. at 32.
Id. Mandatory demonstration of ability and the Good Neighbor
Agreements Program would guarantee community oversight of local industries
in order to increase the performance standards at which local industries
operate. Id.
236
These standards would of course have to allow for reasonable
industry, so that the compromise does not disappear into the details. See
PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 56 (noting that the plan
seeks to promote residential and economic development while protecting
Greenpoint’s ecological balance).
237
PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 42. In order to
protect the residents and workers from environmental hazards, the Greenpoint
plan proposes the use of environmental monitoring and education stations.
These stations will be accessible to the public and located throughout the
Greenpoint community. Id. Moreover, these stations will monitor air, water,
and noise pollution in Greenpoint. Id.
238
Id. at 42. Monitoring systems would be in place to enforce the cleanup
235
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development while retaining a mix of both market rate and
affordable housing units in an effort to satisfy both landlords and
renters worried about gentrification.239
Nevertheless, the City Planning Commission’s response to
Greenpoint’s plan focused inordinately on economic
repercussions for the city and what the city’s role and expenses
would be in implementing aspects of the plan.240 The Commission
seemed most concerned about the aspects of the plan that could
inhibit future industrial sitings in the neighborhood.241 This
response reflects an economic approach to decision making and
indicates reliance on a short-term cost-benefit analysis rather than
a long-term approach that would recognize the benefits inherent
in a participatory process.242 Such a response undermines the
importance of the planning process, and instead removes the
of the Mobil Oil Spill, develop an aggressive and sustained greening program,
enforce existing air pollution controls, and enforce existing regulatory rules
for currently polluting industries. Id.
239
Id. at 33; Handhart Interview, supra note 18 (discussing the need to
account for the demands and fiscal realities of landlords as well as renters).
240
Handhart Interview, supra note 18. Other questions included where
the waste would be deposited and to what extent the city policy would alter
concerning the effective zoning regulations. Id.
241
Id. The commission’s concerns about the inhibition of industrial
development in the neighborhood appears unwarranted. Greenpoint’s
manufacturing zones lie in close proximity to its residential core. Id.
Greenpoint desires to limit industrial expansion to those businesses that enter
into “good neighbor agreements,” demonstrating that they can meet strict
environmental performance standards. Id. An improved quality of life and
healthy environment can generate future jobs. Id. The commission may also be
concerned that the restrictions and regulations on traffic could deter
development. Id.
242
It should be noted that the Commission could have been concerned
about the possibility of Greenpoint’s plan being rooted in NIMBYism, but this
explanation is unlikely, given the presence of industrial sites included in the
plan. See PROPOSED GREENPOINT 197-A, supra note 109, at 38
(recommending, for example, that a plan “retain New town Creek as a
‘Significant Maritime and Industrial Zone’ and an Industrial Sanctuary”).
Also, the Commission made reference to no such concerns with respect to
Vinegar Hill, which tends to show that something else is driving the
Commission. See NYC ZONING STUDY, VINEGAR HILL, supra note 56
(making no reference to NIMBYism).
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people from their government.
VII. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGE
Some planners and scholars have begun to think beyond
short-term economics when it comes to planning decisions,
providing models that can serve as guides to encourage
development of neighborhood plans.243 One such example
proposes creating community-building initiatives by combining
public, private and community resources.244 For example, in
Richmond, Virginia the Department of Community Development
created a Division of Neighborhood Planning that “collaborates
with residents, property owners, businesses, institutions and
other city agencies to develop revitalization plans for specific
neighborhoods that will serve as amendments to the City of
Richmond Master Plan.”245 The City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin
243

One example uses private foundations as sponsors for comprehensive
community planning initiatives. See, e.g., MUNICIPAL ART SOCIETY, THE
WILL TO PLAN:COMMUNITY-INITIATED PLANNING IN NEW YORK CITY at 21
(noting that in addition to the contributions of private organizations, individual
experts often “helped the board prepare the plan for less by donating a great
deal of their time”). A second model creates federally funded partnerships
between universities and communities. See e.g. Federal Funding Available for
Environmental Justice Issues in The Bronx, N.Y. VOICE, Aug. 16, 1995. The
Community/University Environmental Justice Grant awarded $299,939. Id.
The Hostos Community College provided matching funds, making the total
grant $328,939. Id.
244
See, e.g., MAS, STATE OF 197-A PLANNING, supra note 26, at 5
(reviewing and outlining this proposed method for encouraging community
participation). Examples of this method can be found in Richmond, Virginia,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Portland, Oregon.
245
Id. at 7. There are several goals for housing and neighborhood
development in Richmond, including: developing commercial and retail
projects in designated areas to prevent encroachment into residential
communities; building “cooperative relationships with city schools,
community-based organizations, public facilities, and city government” to
improve education, city image, and neighborhood vitality; and eliminating
substandard housing while preserving architectural, historic, and cultural
heritage. For a full review of Richmond’s city plan, including background
information, goals and methods to include community input for housing and
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uses Community Development Block Grant money to finance its
Neighborhood Strategic Planning initiative that “serves as the
mechanism for the development of comprehensive, communitybased, long-term strategic plans for 17 planning areas in the City
of Milwaukee.”246 Drawing leadership from the communities, the
Milwaukee initiative utilizes the city’s technical and financial
resources in its inclusive planning process.247 Portland, Oregon
uses a “Community and Neighborhood Planning Program” to
update its comprehensive plan.248 This program divides the city
neighborhood development see City of Richmond’s Master Plan 2000-2020,
available at http://www.richmondgov.com /ecitizen/documents/masterplan/
masterplan2001.asp (last visited Jan. 6, 2003).
246
For a full review of Milwaukee’s efforts and goals in implementing
this program, see generally City of Milwaukee Community Development
Block Grant Program, available at http://www.ci.mil.wi.us/citygov/doa/
admin/cbga. htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2003) [hereinafter City of Milwaukee
Website]. The Community Block Grant Administration “is responsible for
applying for recommending the allocation of, and overseeing the effective use
of approximately $30 million of federal funds or programs in targeted central
city neighborhoods.” Id. “It is used for housing rehab programs, special
economic development related to job and business development, and public
service programs such as crime prevention, job training, housing for
homeless, youth recreation programs and community organization programs.”
Id. “The CDBG office works collaboratively with nonprofit groups,
government agencies, and public/private coalitions to coordinate activity that
increases home ownership and property values, reduces crime, and promotes
greater employment and business activity.” Id. See also MAS, STATE OF 197-A
PLANNING, supra note 26, at 7 (acknowledging the existence of this method of
planning).
247
See generally City of Milwaukee Website, supra note 246, for a
discussion of the inclusive nature of Milwaukee’s procedures. Milwaukee’s
Community Block Grant Administration “is responsible for applying for,
recommending the allocation of, and overseeing the effective use of
approximately $30 million of federal funds or programs in targeted central city
neighborhoods.” Id. The office “works collaboratively with nonprofit groups,
government agencies, and public/private coalitions to coordinate activity that
increases home ownership and property values, reduces crime, and promotes
greater employment and business activity.” Id. To date, the office has worked
with community leaders to develop neighborhood strategic plans in seventeen
neighborhood planning areas. Id.
248
See generally City of Portland, Oregon, Bureau of Planning, available
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into districts and encourages a participatory process in designing
each district’s comprehensive community plan, focusing on both
the neighborhood’s immediate and long-term goals as well as ongoing regional and citywide efforts.249 All of these programs
encourage community involvement and help forge respectful
relationships between city agencies and community groups.
Although these programs are all relatively new, they indicate an
interest in regulation directed toward encouraging, and
sponsoring, comprehensive community planning.
This article draws on administrative law doctrines to propose
legislative reforms that would place public participation at the
forefront of the land use decision-making process.250 This
at http://www.planning.ci.portland.or.us (last visited Jan. 6, 2003), for a
comprehensive review of Portland’s planning process. The City Council
adopted the Community and Neighborhood Planning Program in May, 1984
“as the city’s approach to updating its Comprehensive Plan/Zoning Map.” Id.
The goal of the program was to “create the opportunity for a more focused
examination of Portland’s neighborhoods, business areas, industrial
sanctuaries, and open space.” Id. Each community plan would address all
Comprehensive Plan goals as well as other issues of significance to each of the
plan areas. Id. To date, the city has adopted four community plans to update
the city’s Comprehensive Plan. Id.
249
See generally COMPREHENSIVE PLAN GOALS AND POLICIES, City of
Portland, Oregon, Bureau of Planning, 12-16 (1999), available at http://
www.planning.ci.portland.or.us/pdf/ComprehensivePlan.pdf (last visited Jan.
6, 2003) (describing how Portland’s Bureau of Planning staff held meetings
with neighborhood associations, civic groups, and trade organizations to
discuss their concerns, and revised the planning process to incorporate their
concerns). Citizen involvement in land use planning is mandated in Oregon
state. See also OREGON’S STATEWIDE PLANNING GOALS AND GUIDELINES:
GOAL 1, OREGON DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT 1,
available at http://www.lcd.state.or.us/goalpdfs/goal01.pdf (last modified
Nov. 1, 2002).
250
See generally Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551552 (2003) (mandating that government agencies make available to the public
information regarding organization, function, and overall activities). The
purpose of Section 552, popularly known as the Freedom of Information Act,
is to require agencies of the Federal Government to disclose certain agency
information for public inspection and copying and to establish and enable
enforcement of the right of any person to obtain access to the records of such
agencies, subject to statutory exemptions, for any public or private purpose.
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legislation should take the form of a modified deference rule.251
The City Planning Commission would be required to defer to
comprehensive community plans that demonstrate the inclusive
nature of its process.252 This legislation would thus reward
comprehensive plans formed by all members of a community
through consensus-building techniques.
A properly structured deference rule requires standards by
which to gauge the amount of consensus building in a community
planning process. This can be measured by efforts such as doorto-door canvassing and distribution of planning materials, but
also by examining the resulting proposed plan. For example, a
mixed-use plan proposed by a community with substantial
industrial and residential bases may be indicative of attempts at
consensus building. The same could be said for a plan that retains
a percentage of existing housing stock or requires multiple types
of residential zoning to curb gentrification. All of these elements
could be deemed evidence that a dialogue took place, and that the
community’s voices were heard and accounted for.
This reform would equalize the ability of all communities to
influence decisions and temper the City Planning Commission’s
discretion to decide such matters based solely on what is most
efficient for the Commission and the city. It would also prevent
administrative corruption and arbitrary decision making by
creating an enforceable standard of review for 197-a plans.253
Id.
251

The deference rule is commonly applied in the courts to administrative
agency decisions. See, e.g., Consolation Nursing Home, Inc. v. Comm’r of
N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, 648 N.E.2d 1326, 1328 (N.Y. 1995) (“An
administrative agency’s exercise of its rule-making powers is accorded a high
degree of judicial deference, especially when the agency acts in the area of its
particular expertise”); N.Y. State Ass’n of Counties v. Axelrod, 577 N.E.2d
16, 30 (N.Y. 1991) (stating that under the usual deference rule, the
“challenger must establish that a regulation is so lacking in reason for its
promulgation that it is essentially arbitrary”).
252
An independent, preferably elected, body could conduct a review of
each plan’s process to determine its inclusiveness.
253
197-a plans are currently relegated to mere “policy guidelines” and no
official standard of review is in place. See supra Part III (noting that
amendments to the City Charter weakened the impact of community-sponsored
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Legislative ratification of inclusive participation would create
respectful working relationships between local governments and
their constituents, encourage accountability and restore integrity
to a democratic system. It would discourage exclusionary actions
by rewarding communities that accept and integrate their fair
share of essential industrial uses. This, in turn, improves
community acceptance of essential, yet undesirable, land use by
fostering self-determination in siting decisions, thereby reducing
negative reactions to industrial land use. This article also
advocates for provision of funding for community planning.
Distribution of funds and resources remedies disparity in
community attempts at planning by removing obstacles faced by
low-income communities.254 Moreover, the city should be
involved, financially and technically, with the community from
the outset to encourage such consensus building.
The 197-a process set forth in the City Charter should be
amended to include this deference rule and funding allowance. 255
Although such participation may be less efficient in the shortterm, the long-term effects of community consensus and
empowerment will benefit the city by restoring legitimacy to its
process.256 The reform’s emphasis on the process rather than the
197-a plans).
254
See supra Part IV (discussing the adverse effects that disparity in
access to financial and technical resources has had upon the relative success of
the case study plans).
255
See generally N.Y.C. Charter § 197-a (setting forth the current
procedure for community-sponsored plans).
256
This legislative amendment could counter some of the criticisms of the
current 197-a process. For example, one weakness of 197-a plans is that they
are not legally binding, and therefore can serve as nothing more than
“references for decision making in a particular area.” See Jocelyn Chait,
Community-based
Planning:
Moving
Beyond
the
Rhetoric,
at
http://www.plannersnetwork.org/ htm/pub/archives/147/Chait.html (May/June
2001) (noting that “[d]espite the fact that ‘197-a plans’ must go through
exhaustive public review and scrutiny prior to their adoption by the City
Council, they are not legally binding. At best, they serve as references for
decision making in a particular area.”). Another criticism is that inadequate
funding for plans leads to “inefficiencies and delays, strains the energy and
resources of community residents, and ultimately leads to burnout and
disillusionment.” Id. See also New York League of Conservation Voters, 197-
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result would provide an immediate reward for all communities
that approach the planning process inclusively and openly. These
reforms would most likely withstand judicial scrutiny.257 It would
be difficult to challenge a policy of deference as arbitrary and
capricious, in light of case law and statutes supporting land use
decisions made “in accordance with a general plan.”258
a Needs Some 911, ECO POLITICS, available at http://www.nylcv.org/
ecopolitics/nyc.htm (Winter 2001-2002) (commenting on lack of funding or
support for the plans and the inaction of agencies based on their view of the
plans as impediments to Mayoral directives).
257
The proposed amendment could draw on judicial standards of review
applicable in cases examining compliance with public participation
requirements under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. See, e.g.,
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The
Supreme Court set forth the standard of review in such cases as follows:
The generally applicable standards of § 706 [of the Administrative
Procedure Act] require the reviewing court to engage in a substantial
inquiry. Certainly, the [agency’s] decision is entitled to a presumption
of regularity. But that presumption is not to shield [the agency’s]
action from a thorough, probing, in-depth review. The court is first
required to decide whether the [agency] acted within the scope of [its]
authority . . . Scrutiny of the facts does not end, however, with the
determination that the [agency] acted within the scope of [its]
statutory authority. Section 706(2)(A) requires a finding that the
actual choice made was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. To make this
finding the court must consider whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a
clear error of judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be
searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow
one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of
the agency. The final inquiry is whether the [agency’s] action
followed the necessary procedural requirements. Such a requirement
would make it more likely that the amendment would be enforceable,
and not merely another vague nod to public participation.
Id. at 415-17.
258
See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926) (validating a zoning ordinance based upon its comprehensive plan for
the community); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatre, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1985)
(holding a zoning ordinance to be valid since it was designed to promote the
interests of the city); Wulfsohn v. Burden, 150 N.E. 120 (N.Y. 1925)
(upholding a zoning regulation that promoted the general needs and values of
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Furthermore, laws that encourage public participation in land use
advance a legitimate governmental interest by restoring
democracy and consistency to the decision-making process.259
Because an adopted plan would remain a policy guide, the
city would not be bound to the plan if implementation would have
undue detrimental effects on neighboring communities or on the
city as a whole.260 In the event that the city were to adopt
neighboring 197-a plans that conflict at some future point, the
city could retain authority to mediate and decide the best course
of action after conducting public meetings to discuss mediation.
Finally, if a community-sponsored plan were deemed
exclusionary, it could be stricken. In short, a deference rule is
just that—deferential. The city would remain in a position to
rebut a presumption of deference to enforce equal protection
considerations.
CONCLUSION
The 197-a process is a good starting point for democratizing
land use decision making in New York City. However, as the
case studies set forth above highlight, more effort must be
expended to reward and encourage public participation. The City
Planning Commission’s inconsistent review of 197-a plans
indicates that some degree of reform is necessary. Public
the community).
259
Many statutes evince a government interest in public participation.
See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 272-a(1) (McKinney 2003) (stating that public
participation in the planning process promotes the most “optimum town
comprehensive plan” for development); see also N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV.
LAW § 27-0101 (McKinney 2003) (stating that the legislative purpose is best
met when the public has knowledge and provides consent).
260
See e.g., Stanley D. Abrams, Flexible Zoning Techniques to Meet
State and Local Growth Policies, 930 A.L.I. 537 (1994) (finding that flexible
techniques in development plans are a more efficient way to meet the goals of
community plans); Richard T. LeGates, The Emergence of Flexible Growth
Management Systems in the San Francisco Bay Area, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1035 (1991) (discussing the effect rapid community growth has on
development plans and concluding the “tempo control” allows planning goals
to be met most effectively).
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participation and inclusive, consensus-building processes must be
recognized as important elements of community planning. One
way to recognize the importance of public participation in land
use matters is for the city to make such participation more
accessible by providing financial grants and planning workshops.
Ultimately, however, an amendment to Section 197-a is the
optimal method to mandate deference to plans developed through
an inclusive community process. Such reform is the most
effective means to encourage public participation and remove a
degree of the City Planning Commission’s power to permit
purely political or economic factors to control land use decision
making.

